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NASA AVIATION SAFETY REPORTING SYSTEM: FOURTH QUARTERLY REPORT
JANUARY 15-APRIL 14, 1977
Ames Research Center
and
Aviation Safety Reporting System Office*
SUMMARY
During the fourth quarter of ASRS operations, 1325 reports were received. A decline in
reports concerning small aircraft was noted; more reports involved transport aircraft, professional
pilots, instrument meteorological conditions, and weather problems. A study of 136 reports of
operational problems in terminal radar service areas was made. Pilot, controller, and system factors
were found to be associated with these occurrences. Information transfer difficulties were prom-
inent. Misunderstandings by pilots, and in some cases by controllers, of the policies and limitations
of terminal radar programs were observed.
INTRODUCTION
This is the fourth in a series of reports describing the activities of the NASA Aviation Safety
Reporting System (ASRS). It covers the period from January 15, 1977 through April 14, 1977, the
System's fourth quarter of operation under a Memorandum of Agreement signed on August 15,
1975 by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Federal Aviation
Administration.
This report summarizes certain data for the first year of operation of ASRS, but focuses on
activities during the fourth quarter. It presents the results of the fourth quarter's work, describes
certain studies conducted using ASRS data, and discusses the results of one such study. Appendix A
presents examples of alert bulletins disseminated by the ASRS and responses to those bulletins.
Many of the bulletins illustrate types of data discussed in the report. Appendix B contains a sample
of de-identified ASRS reports that are illustrative of the problems reported to ASRS.
With the exception of certain quarterly and annual statistics, the data in this report cover the
period from January 15, 1977, through March 31, 1977. This adjustment has been made in order to
convert the System's data processing and reporting activities to a calendar quarter basis. The fifth
quarterly report will cover the period from April 1, 1977 through June 30,1977.
•Battelle's Columbus Division, Mountain View, California
FOURTH QUARTER REPORT: SUBMISSION CHARACTERISTICS
Report Volume
During the fourth quarter of ASRS operations, 1325 reports were received. This is an increase
over the 1249' reports received during the third quarter but a decrease compared with the first and
second quarters of operation. The mean weekly receipt of reports during the year was 106 with a
standard deviation of 32. Total volume through March 31, 1977 was 5268 reports.
Sources of Reports
Air traffic controllers submitted 53% of the reports during the fourth quarter; they had
submitted 51% of the reports received during the previous 6 months. Pilots and other aircrew
members submitted 46% during both periods.
Callback Actions
Attempts to contact reporters for follow-up were made in 1 7% of the cases, as in the previous
quarter. In 10% of the cases, telephone contact was established; letters were used to contact 4%
who could not be reached by telephone.
FAA Queries of Incident Identification File
During the fourth quarter, 596 FAA queries were received. This suggests increasing use of the
query mechanism to determine whether reports have been submitted to ASRS regarding occur-
rences for which enforcement action is being considered (table 1). Occurrences on file were again
less than 10% of total queries. This proportion has remained relatively constant through the first
TABLE 1.- INCIDENT IDENTIFICATION FILE INQUIRIES
Types of action
ASRS report volume
Inquiries received
Occurrences in file
Positive inquiries,
percent of inquiries
received
Positive inquiries,
percent of report
volume
Period
4/15/76-
10/14/76
2961
664
61
9.2
2.1
10/15/76-
1/1 4/77: •'
1249 "
513
56
10.9
4.5
1/15/77-
4/14/77
1325
596
50
8.4
3.8
Year
4/15/76-
4/14/77
5535
1773
167
9.4
3.0
'Third quarter report volume was incorrectly stated as 1429, rather than 1249 reports, in NASA TM X-3546,
page 2.
2
year of ASRS operation. It is interesting to speculate whether this figure of 10% bears any
relationship to the proportion of occurrences in the aviation system which are reported to the
System. A study is planned to examine this question.
FOURTH QUARTER REPORTS: CHARACTERISTICS OF OCCURRENCES
Types of Operations
The types of operations in which occurrences
were reported are summarized in table 2. As might
be expected during the winter months, air carrier
operations, corporate and personal business flying,
and military operations contributed a greater pro-
portion of reports; the proportion of utility, plea-
sure, and training flights decreased. A rather sharp
decline in air taxi and charter operations (8.6 to
5.8%) was noted.
Flight Plans. Weather
As in the past, over three-fourths of ASRS
reports concerned aircraft on instrument flight plans
(table 3). Flight conditions at the time of occur-
rences are shown in table 4. The decrease in visual
meteorological conditions seen during the fourth
quarter is undoubtedly due to winter weather, mani-
festations of which were also observed in reporters'
comments regarding weather pertinent to their
occurrences (table 5). Reports of significant weather
factors increased by over 9% during the quarter.
TABLE 2.- TYPES OF OPERATIONS IN
OCCURRENCE REPORTS
User category
Scheduled air carrier3
Supplemental air carrier
Air taxi
Charter operations
Utility flying
Agricultural operations
Corporate aviation
Personal business flying
Pleasure flying
Training, all types
Armed forces
Government, other.
and unknown
Period
7/15/76-
1/14/77
1/15/77-
3/31/77
Percent of
reports received
36.1
1.7
5.7
2.9
2.2
0.7
8.1
7.2
8.5
10.2
14.1
2.6
41.0
0.5
3.5
2.3
0.7
0.9
7.8
8.1
7.8
9.8
14.7
2.8
aThis category was incorrectly reported in
the previous quarterly report and caused
figures for the other categories to be incorrectly
summarized.
TABLE 3.- FLIGHT PLANS FILED
Type of flight plan
Instrument flight
rules (1FR)
Visual flight
rules (VFR)
DVFRorSVFR
No flight plan
7/15/76-
10/14/76
10/15/76-
1/14/77
1/15/77-
3131 111
reports received
65
15
1
19
78
19
0
3
76
12
0
12
Flight conditions
Visual meteorological
con dit ions (VMC)
Instrument meteorological
conditions (IMC) and
mixed IMC/VMC
Unknown
Period
7/15/65-
1/14/77
1/15/77-
3/31 111
Percent of
reports received
78
21
1
70
29
1
TABLE 5.- WEATHER FACTORS IN
ASRS REPORTS
Weather factor
Restricted visibility
Precipitation
Thunderstorm
Turbulence
Crosswind
Haze, fog
Ice
Snow
Ceiling
Other
Weather not a factor
Period
7/15/76-
1/14/77
1/15/77-
3/31/77
Percent of
reports received
20
6
3
•>
2
1
1
0
1
2
63
18
8
1
5
2
2
3
1
2
4
54
TABLE 6.- AIRCRAFT TYPES IN
ASRS REPORTS
Type of aircraft
Small aircraft,
<1 2,500 Ib
Medium transport.
12,500-1 00,000 Ib
Heavy transport.
1 00,000-300,000 Ib
Wide-body transport.
>300,000 Ib
Military aircraft.
all types
Other aircraft
Period
7/15/76-
1/14/77
1/15/77-
3/31/77
Percent of
reports, received
50
41"Tl
7
2
40
53J +J
6
1
Other Characteristics of Reports
A decline in the number and proportion of reports
involving small aircraft (<12,500 Ib) was noted during
the fourth quarter (table 6). This decrease was compen-
sated for by a 12% increase in reports involving trans-
port aircraft. Coupled with this, there was a significant
increase in reports involving pilots who reported high
flying time, both total and during the last 90 days
(table 7).
Another phenomenon of some interest was noted
during the fourth quarter. Reports of near midair colli-
sions (estimated miss distance less than 500 ft) com-
prised 23% of total reports, compared with 25% during
the two previous quarters. (The difference is not signifi-
cant.) Reports in which evasive action was taken or in
which there was no time for evasive action, however,
declined significantly, from 27% of total reports to less
than 15% of reports. It is interesting to note the coinci-
dence of this sharp decline with an increase in the
proportion of reports coming from pilots whose recent
and total experience is high. One may speculate that
pilots with more experience are better able to judge
whether evasive action is required. An attempt will be
made to determine whether this association is real or
apparent.
In summary, the January-March data indicate an
increase in report volume over the previous quarter,
coupled with relative increases in reports involving
TABLE 7.- FLIGHT EXPERIENCE OF
REPORTING PILOTS
Reported hours
a. Total flight time
0-3000 hr
>3000 hr
b. Recent flight time
(90 days)
0-75 hr
>75hr
Period
7/15/76-
1/14/77
1/15/77-
3131 111
Percent of
pilots reporting
41.5
58.5
37.3
62.7
27.1
72.9
29.3
70.7
transport aircraft, professional or at any rate high-time pilots, weather factors, and night and
high-altitude operations. All of these are indicative of a probable decline in general aviation small
aircraft traffic, probably associated with winter weather. An interesting decline in the proportion of
potential conflicts requiring evasive action was noted; this finding is presently unexplained.
Problems Discussed in ASRS Reports
In previous reports (refs. 1, 2, and 3) the use of problem codes to categorize ASRS reports was
described; while these codes are only rough descriptors, they are useful as a means of focusing
attention on certain categories of problems. The current quarter's data are compared with reports
from the two previous categories in table 8.
Examination of the problem codes for the fourth quarter showed increases in the FLC, ACF,
and PUB categories. Statistical evaluation indicates that only the increase in reports relating to
puolications and procedures is significant (p < 0.05).
TABLE 8.- DISTRIBUTION OF ASRS REPORTS BY PROBLEM CODE
Problem code
ATC (air traffic control function)
FLC (flight crew function)
NAV (air or surface navigation or commun-
ications equipment or facility)
ACF (aircraft structure or subsystem
APT (airport and subsystems)
PUB (publications and procedures)
NMA (potential conflict between aircraft,
not assignable to ATC or FLC categories
ACC (aircraft accident)
OTH (all other classes of problems)
Period
7/15/76-
1/14/77
1/15/77-
3/31/77
Percent of reports received
43.5
22.1
8.9
2.6
5.8
1.8
12.8
0.7
1.7
40.3
27.2
9.1
3.9 (n.s.)
5.2
3.1 (0.02<p<0.05)
10.0
0.4
0.8
ASRS ALERT BULLETINS
Quarterly and cumulative Alert Bulletin statistics are shown in table 9. The number of alert
bulletins submitted during the fourth quarter was 93, somewhat above that of previous quarters.
During the first year of operation, 312 alert bulletins were submitted, about 5.6% of total report
volume. The disposition of alert bulletins is shown in table 10 for the fourth quarter and for the
year.
TABLE 9.- ASRS ALERT BULLETINS: PROBLEMS BY CATEGORIES
Category
Hardxvare:
Navigation
Communication
Aircraft
Other
Software:
Regualtions and procedures
Navigation charts
Computer software
OAM/FOM
Liveware:
Communication problems
Management problems
Other
Environment:
Airport problems
Surface hazards
Airborne hazards
Quarter
First Second I Third I Fourth Year
Percent of Alert Bulletins Submitted
10
8
3
I
18
8
4
1
11
6
5
16
5
4
7
5
0
0
21
12
2
0
12
3
3
33
0
0
6
8
2
2
26
3
3
T
3
2
2
29
6
3
13
9
3
->
18
5
2
•>
7
7
7
T*J.S.
2
4
9
8
•>
1
21
7
3
1
8
4
4
- 25
3
3
TABLE 10.- RESPONSES TO ASRS ALERT BULLETINS
Type of action
Alert Bulletins submitted
Submitted for information only
No response received to date
Responses received as of June 15, 1977
Content of responses received to date:
Information insufficient to permit
investigation of problem
Information in bulletin incorrect
or incomplete
After study, no system problem
found; no action required
Alert bulletin under investigation
Investigation complete; action on the
problem not within FAA purview
Action to resolve the problem was in
progress when bulletin was received
Action has been or will be initiated
to resolve problem
Action has been taken and is complete
Current
quarter
1/1/77-
3/31/77
93
1
25
67
1
0
16
2
0
16
11
21
Year
4/15/76-
3/31/77
312
4
42
266
12
6
62
20
2
43
67
54
STUDIES OF THE ASRS DATABASE
During the fourth quarter of operations, several requests were received for studies of the ASRS
database. To the extent possible, these requests were complied with. These studies were concerned
with a variety of specific topics; one analytic study of possible general interest is presented in this
report.
It should be pointed out again that because the ASRS is a voluntary system, it is not possible
to draw any conclusions concerning the incidence or prevalence of any problems in the national
aviation system from ASRS reports. Reports submitted to ASRS represent simply the reporter's
perception of a particular event, occurrence, or situation.
What can be gained from such reports is an indication of how certain factors in the aviation
system are perceived by the persons within that system, and often how those persons respond to
such factors. It is not possible, for instance, to determine from these data how prevalent a particular
airport marking problem may be; it is quite possible, however, to determine from a small number of
reports that a particular marking configuration is misunderstood, nof*seen under specific circum-
stances, or confused for something else.
The primary purpose of the ASRS is to assist in understanding some of the reasons for
particular occurrences, rather than to place blame for such occurrences. It is in this frame of
reference that the following study was performed.
OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS IN TERMINAL RADAR SERVICE AREAS:
A REVIEW OF ASRS DATA
Summary
A large fraction of ASRS reports describe occurrences in terminal airspace. Of 136 reports that
related to TCA and TRSA operating environments, 70% involved potential conflicts among aircraft.
These reports were studied to determine what human and system factors were associated with
operational problems in TCA's and TRSA's.
Half of the reports involved primarily non-participating aircraft. One-third involved ATC and
controller problems. The remainder involved equipment and airspace design problems.
Pilot problems were often associated with information transfer problems: misunderstood
clearances, lack of understanding of TRSA procedures, lack of knowledge of airspace boundaries, or
ATC equipment and system limitations.
Controller problems were more often related to deficiencies in coordination or to incorrect
actions. High workloads, unfamiliarity, and misunderstandings on the part of both controllers and
pilots were contributory factors.
Airspace design appeared to be associated with pilot behavior in a number of instances,
particularly in areas where such design is constrained by a variety of other environmental factors.
Equipment factors were most often related to the inability of ATC radar to provide consistent
information on non-transponder equipped aircraft. ARTS failures were also associated with prob-
lems, especially when the failures were subtle ones.
ATC procedures and policies were associated with two types of problems. One relates to
control of VFR aircraft at altitudes below ATC minimum vectoring altitudes. Under certain
circumstances, pilots of such aircraft cannot maintain terrain and obstruction clearance off pub-
lished routes and still adhere to ATC instructions. Another more insidious problem relates to
misunderstanding by pilots, and in some cases by controllers, of the policies, the underlying
rationale, and the limitations of terminal radar programs and services. Examples are provided of
problems in each of these areas.
Introduction
Early scans of ASRS database entries indicated that a substantial proportion (over 50%) of
reports concerned occurrences in terminal airspace. In the first 2300 reports entered in the
database, 360 (16%) reported occurrences in Terminal Control Areas (TCA's) or Terminal Radar
Service Areas (TRSA's). Examination of these reports showed that many of them did not relate
specifically to the TRSA operating environment. Of 136 reports that did relate to the operating
environment, however, 95 (70%) involved potential conflicts among aircraft. Fifty (37%) of the
reports were concerned with near midair collisions. Because of this, it was decided to conduct a
systematic study of the 136 reported occurrences in TCA's and TRSA's, with the intent of
'determining what human and system factors were associated with problems in this operating
environment.
Background
Terminal control Areas and Terminal Radar Service Areas were devised by the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) in order to provide safer, more efficient traffic flow into and out of
high volume terminal areas. Using ARTS-HI radar and computational equipment, controllers are
able to provide traffic sequencing and separation to all (TCA) or all participating (TRSA) traffic
within a defined block of airspace, and thus to assist pilots approaching, transiting, or departing
from hub and certain satellite airports. The services available are the same in the two classes of
airspace; the main conceptual difference is that use of such services is mandatory in TCA's and
voluntary in TRSA's,
The concept of mandatory traffic control in terminal control areas has been subject to
criticism, primarily from segments of general aviation, since its beginning in the Atlanta area in
1972. These criticisms have centered on the considerable volume of designated airspace in which
pilots must submit to ATC control regardless of weather or traffic conditions at the time. More
recently, with the introduction of terminal radar service areas, additional criticisms of awkward and
time-consuming air traffic control procedures have been heard from the same segment of the
community, as well as from some air carrier pilots trying to minimize flying time and fuel
consumption.
On the other hand, the concept of mandatory control in terminal areas has received strong
support from pilots of heavy air transport aircraft and from the controllers responsible for terminal
radar operations. Air carrier pilots argue, with justification, that the procedures required in large
turbojet aircraft simply do not permit even a multi-person crew to adhere to the "see and avoid"
concept of air traffic separation, especially in view of the high cockpit workloads imposed by
mandatory noise abatement procedures and complex flight patterns in terminal areas. Controllers,
faced with heavy concentrations of terminal area traffic during certain hours, also argue with
justification that it is simply not possible to cope with large volumes of high-speed traffic in the face
of numbers of slow-speed, uncontrolled aircraft in the same airspace. It was believed that examina-
tion of ASRS reports might assist in placing these arguments in perspective.
Definitions
TERMINAL RADAR SERVICE AREA: Airspace surrounding designated airports wherein
ATC provides radar vectoring, sequencing, and separation on a full-time basis for all IFR and
participating VFR aircraft. Service provided in a TRSA is called stage III service . .. Pilot participa-
tion is urged but is not mandatory.
TERMINAL CONTROL AREA: Controlled airspace extending upward from the surface or
higher to specified altitudes, within which all aircraft are subject to operating rules and pilot and
equipment requirements specified in FAR part 91. The radar service provided in TCA's is stage III
service, as in TRSA's.
POTENTIAL CONFLICT: As used in this study, any perceived problem related to the risk of
airborne collision, from "less than standard separation" to "near midair collision, too close for
evasive action."
NEAR MIDAIR COLLISION: As used in this study, a potential conflict in which the
estimated miss distance was 500 ft or less, or in which evasive action was required to prevent an
imminent midair collision, or in which there was no time for evasive action.
Pertinent portions of the Airman's Information Manual, part 1, and of FAA Handbook
7110.65, Air Traffic Control, are extracted in appendix C of this report.
Approach
Three hundred fifty-six reports coded as having occurred in or adjacent to a TRSA or TCA
were examined to determine whether they were in any way related specifically to rules, procedures,
and practices of the TRSA operating environment. This determination was made based on the
operating rules for Terminal Radar Programs shown in appendix C. One hundred thirty-six reports
met this criterion and were selected for further study. Each of these reports was evaluated in detail;
pertinent data were extracted and tabulated. Primary enabling factors (ref. 3) were categorized.
TABLE 11.- TYPES OF REPORTS IN SAMPLE
Type of report
Potential conflict between aircraft
Operational problem not involving a
potential conflict
Nonparticipant operation within TCA or TRSA
airspace
Reports not involving an occurrence
Airspace environment problems
Miscellaneous occurrence
No. of reports
95
24
10
4
2
1
136
"Some reports fell into more than one category: the dominant
theme of the report was used in this classification.
TABLE 12.- POTENTIAL CONFLICTS
BETWEEN AIRCRAFT
Conflict category
Near midair collision
Less than standard separation
Type of aircraft
TCA
22
21°
TRSA
28
24
flTCA not in use in one case.
TABLE 13.- REPORTED LOCATIONS OF OCCURRENCES
TCA's
Location
NYC
DEN
PHL
DFW
DTW
PIT
STL
MKC
CLE
MSP
LAX
LAS
SFO
ORD
Others (each
in different
locations)
No. of reports
17
9
5
5
5
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
4
—
72
TRSA's
Location
BAL
PHX
TUS
SDF
- MKE
SAN
DSM
GSO
SAT
OKC
FWA
SYR
Others (each
in different
locations)
No. of reports
7
5
4
"3
3
2
2
2
2
- 2
2
2
28
—64
partitioned by report source, and
tabulated. Each of the major cate-
gories was then examined in
further detail in order to discern
human and system factors asso-
c i a t e d w i t h the selected
occurrences.
The types of occurrences in
the 136 reports varied widely.
Table 11 categorizes the reports
by type of occurrence or by situa-
tion described.
Potential conflicts between
aircraft, the largest category, can
be further categorized as shown in
table 12.
Operational problems not
involving a potential conflict were
further categorized by the part of
the system in which they
occurred. Operational problems
involving flight crew were cited in
14 reports; problems involving
ATC personnel were cited in
10 reports.
The locations of occurrences
were tabulated; they are shown in
table 13. Occurrences were
reported from 18 of 21 TCA's and
from 40 of 75 TRSA's. Specific
local factors in certain locations
are discussed below.
Since this study was initiated
and since the computer search was
performed in March, 1977, incom-
ing ASRS reports have been
studied to determine whether
types of problems other than
those cited here were being
reported. None has been observed,
though in some cases further illus-
trative material has been supplied.
10
Some examples quoted in" the discussion are from later reports, but all tabular data describe only
the original sample.
Results and Discussion
Classification of Occurrences— Table 14 shows a general classification of the primary enabling
factors believed to be represented in 136 reports. The classification is somewhat arbitrary but
provides a focal point for further discussion of the data. Aircraft and pilot factors were primary in
48% of the reports. Controller and ATC factors were believed to be primary in 38% of the reports.
The remainder were concerned primarily with equipment and airspace configuration problems. Each
of these factors is considered below.
In the 6-month period during which these reports were received, air traffic controllers
submitted 51% of all (2961) ASRS reports. Controllers were the source of 43% of the 136 reports
considered in this study, a significantly lower fraction (p < 0.05). The difference may suggest that
TABLE 14.- CATEGORIES OF PROBLEMS
Factor
A. Aircraft and pilot factors
1. Entered TCA without clearance
2. Entered TRSA as nonparticipant
3. Canceled IFR in TRSA, refused 111
4. Did not adhere to clearance
5. Misunderstood instructions/rules
6. Other pilot factor
Subtotal
B. ATC and controller factors
1 . Handling problem
2. Proficiency /training/supervision
3. Interfacility coordination
4. ATC procedures and policies
5. Failed to point out/unable to
detect traffic
Subtotal
C. Equipment factors
1. Airborne equipment failure/malfunction
2. Ground equipment failure/malfunction
Subtotal
D. Airspace/environmental factors
1 . Boundary /configuration problem
Subtotal
TOTAL
TCA
20
7
2
1
30
11
2
4
6
5
28
4
3
7
7
7
72
TRSA
26
3
4
1
34
9
3
2
3
8
25
1
2
3
2
2
64
Total
64 (48%)
53 (38%)
10 (7%)
9 (7%)
136(100%)
11
TABLE 15.- PROBLEMS BY TYPE OF REPORTER
Problem
A. Pilot factors
1. Entered TCA without clearance
2. Entered TRSA as nonparticipant
3. Canceled IFR, refused stage III
4. Did not adhere to clearance
5. Misunderstood instructions/rules
6. Other pilot factor
Substotal
B. ATC and controller factors
1. Handling problem
2. Proficiency/training/supervision
3. Interfacility coordination
4. ATC procedures and policies
5. Failed to point out/unable to
detect traffic
Subiotal
C. Equipment factors
1. Airborne equipment
2. Ground equipment
Subtotal
D. Airspace factors
1. Boundary problems
Percent of reports
submitted bv:
Pilots Controllers
14
15
3
3
6
1
42
12
3
4
9
15
43
3
3
6
10
16
24
2
9
2
2
55
19
5
5
3
2
34 ,
5
5
10
2
flying personnel are more likely to per-
ceive problems in TCA and TRSA oper-
ations than are ATC personnel. The fac-
tors shown in table 15 were partitioned
by reporter category in an effort to
examine this point. The results are
shown in table 15.
With few exceptions, the data for
each of the primary factors do not dif-
fer significantly from the overall distri-
bution of reports. There are exceptions,
however. Pilots were much more likely
to report problems which in their view
resulted from a failure to point out
conflicting traffic. It should be noted
that in some cases traffic may not have
been pointed out because targets were
not visible on radar. Pilots were also
more likely to report occurrences that
could be considered indicative of ATC
policy or procedural problems. Finally,
pilots were more likely to describe
problems related to TCA and TRSA
boundaries.
Controller reports of pilots' non-
adherence to clearances, and pilot
reports of misunderstanding of instruc-
tions, may be in effect one class of
occurrences perceived differently by the two categories of reporters. If the two classes are
combined, the distribution by reporter category is almost exactly the same as the overall ASRS
report distribution.
Aircraft and pilot factors in occurrences— The most common factors in this sample of reports
were entering TCA's without-clearances and entering TRSA's as nonparticipants. These factors,
together with non-adherence to clearances in TCA's and refusing stage III radar service in TRSA's,
were primary factors in 62 occurrences, or in 46% of the sample. These reports were re-examined in"
an effort to ascertain reasons for the cited behavior. It should be recognized (see appendix C) that
participation in radar services in TRSA's is voluntary, whereas it is required in TCA's. The number
of potential conflicts in both types of environment suggests that nonparticipation in stage III
operations may involve some degree of risk; it is important, therefore, to look for reasons for these
occurrences across both subsets of the data.
Table 16 shows a breakout of identifiable enabling factors in these 62 occurrences. It must be
noted that the degree of certainty with which a possible enabling factor may be ascribed to an
occurrence varies with the detail available in the report; this, in turn, often is a function of who
submitted it. Also, though it may be possible to say with some confidence that an occurrence was
12
TABLE 16.- POSSIBLE REASONS FOR TCA/TRSA
OCCURRENCES INVOLVING PILOT FACTORS
Stated or hypothesized reason Number of reports
Action appears to have been deliberate:
Reason unknown
Unanticipated delay in clearance
Subtotal
Action appears to have been inadvertent:
Lack of knowledge of system
Lack of knowledge of position
Lack of comprehension of English
Equipment problems
Reason unknown
Subtotal
Unknown on basis of available data
Other reason
TOTAL
19
3
22(3570
11
3
3
1
3
21 (347c)
18(20^-)
1 (2%)
62(100%)
deliberate, it is usually not possible to say why the action was taken, since the reporter in these
cases is often not the person who took the action.
It is believed that 22, or one-third, of these actions were deliberate. In a few TCA reports, it is
clear that the reporter simply continued on his course in expectation of an imminent clearance
which was not given him until he was well inside the area:
I attempted to call Cleveland Approach Control as published on charts as I was
VFR at 5500 ft. I tried reporting my position at 20 n. mi. from CLE VOR; my
transponder was on, squawking mode C 1200. My attempts to contact approach
were negated in the heavy traffic. At 15 n. mi. contact was made as I continued on
course (060 to Lost Nation) but the controller's hurried response made his requests
unintelligible. I was unable to get him to "say again" until approximately 10 n. mi.
at which point I was asked to contact 125.35 (an unpublished frequency). This
frequency too was jammed and contact could not be made until approximately
5—6 n. mi. at which point I was given a transponder code, and radar contact was
made while I was 4-5 n. mi. south of Hopkins, still at 5500 MSL. I was immediately
vectored to a heading of 090 to avoid the airport and soon chastised for failure to be
in touch with Cleveland while in the TCA. Due to his work load I did not take time
to explain ... that their failure to communicate put me in this predicament.
Looking back, I probably should have altered my course to avoid the TCA, but
how can a pilot predict how long it will take ... to get a clearance?
In a few cases, it is clear that a pilot (usually not the reporter) was deliberately circumventing the
rules of the system:
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Shortly after turning to the SID heading of 340° we passed directly over the
second aircraft. An engine failure shortly after takeoff could have resulted in a
collision. The second aircraft was apparently violating the TCA. The Tower did not
advise of the aircraft and I presume they were not aware of it. The other aircraft
appeared to be flying at about 50 ft above the water, presumably in a deliberate
attempt to operate unobserved in the TCA ...
In 8 of 26 instances in the "TRSA nonparticipant" category the pilot apparently did not wish to
utilize radar services, as is his right:
At about 0124 I was working the north arrival sector at Baltimore Approach
Control. Visibility was reported 5 miles with haze, sky partially obscured. I had
under my control two air carriers, one of which was acft A. 1 cleared acft A for an
ILS rwy 15R approach; no vectoring was required as he was over a transition fix. As
acft A approached the outer marker, I was issuing traffic information to him on a
target of his 2 o'clock position at 10 miles. It appeared the targets would merge so I
continued issuing the traffic every few seconds. Acft A's pilot stated he had the
target when they were less than 1 mile apart and would level off at 3800 ft until
clear of traffic. I continued to monitor the target ... and was able to identify it
through Martin Tower ... I had worked this same aircraft earlier in the shift,
southwestbound to Dulles and gave him radar handoff to Dulles Approach. The pilot
appeared knowledgeable at the time and I do not know why he did not request radar
traffic services on his return trip. I believe this situation occurred because of
restricted visibility with haze at night. Also, the practice of the pilot in flying across
the approach path at approximately 3000 ft is not, I believe, a wise choice.
In three other cases, pilots of air carrier aircraft entered a TRSA on an IFR flight plan, then
canceled IFR and refused further radar services. While they also were within their rights, it should
be noted that this can cause serious problems for controllers when it occurs without advance
warning:
Acft A called for landing and was given a heading to put him in a position for a
left downwind for runway 01 and was given a descent clearance to 6000 ft when
20 north of SDF. He reported he wanted to proceed VFR and he took it upon
himself to descend. I gave him a heading because he was heading down the departure
path for runway 01. At this point he was 10 miles north and he advised he was VFR
and going to go east of the airport. He was out of 4000 ft and I told him he was
about to enter into Bowman's control zone and he was given additional information
and departures off the runway. I told him to contact the southeast controller which
he ignored. He went to local frequency and continued his descent into the Bowman
traffic pattern.
Greensboro weather scattered clouds 2-1/2 miles visibility. Flight being vec-
tored out of the way of other traffic. Acft requested to be turned toward airport. I
told him he was on a heading for it. He asked what number he was for approach. I
could not approve the approach. He canceled IFR, refused stage III. I told him
Winston-Salem was IFR and asked how he was going to operate. He replied, "VFR,
going to Tower." On his first call to Tower, he requested SVFR into the control
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zone. He was advised to return to Approach Control for clearance into the control
zone. He then reported inside the control zone and was cleared to land ...
In another case (two such instances have been reported by controllers) an air carrier pilot cancelled
IFR and refused further radar services while descending within the boundaries of a TCA. These
cases, and others involving TRSA's, have given rise to questions as to how familiar air carrier pilots
are with the locations, limits, and operating rules governing these types of airspace:
Aircraft was on vectors to an ILS rwy 27R at Philadelphia. Apparently, for no
reason, the airplane turned westbound and descended below the floor of the TCA.
When queried as to his intentions, the pilot stated that he had cancelled IFR and was
proceeding visually to the airport. Fortunately he was far enough behind other
traffic so that no immediate evasive action was required.
Another problem of nonparticipation in stage III (TRSA) procedures relates to organizations
or agencies (located either at hub or nearby satellite airports) that habitually refuse stage III
services. This appears to be a particular problem at certain locations:
Acft A on a training flight from Tucson, Arizona, came within 1/4 mile at the
same altitude with acft B departing Davis-Monthan AFB. A government agency has a
fleet of aircraft based at DMA. These aircraft do not use stage III service which is
available in the Tucson area. Acft A made a low approach at Tucson, rwy 11L, was
given a left turn heading 030 to return on a 'stereo' recovery. As acft A was making
his turn I saw a target depart DMA and make a right downwind departure. Since this
departure was negative stage III, D-M Tower was not required to call the departure
to us. Midway between the two airports, the incident occurred. This problem has
occurred many times ...
A serious problem, both in TRSA's and elsewhere, is light aircraft that fly across ILS approach
paths at or near the outer marker at or near final approach fix altitude:
Airline acft over Gilbert locator approaching rwy 5R at Cleveland, altitude
3200 ft, was advised of light acft at 3500, 2-3 o'clock westbound. Weather 5000
broken, 5 miles haze. At 2800 ft traffic was sighted at same altitude at
12:30—1:00 o'clock at 1/2 mile on collision course. Airline pilot executed evasive
turn and missed light aircraft by 1000 ft laterally and 100 ft vertically. Airline acft
climbed to 3000 ft and was vectored for another approach and subsequent landing
... the light aircraft was operating in this area without clearance or approval. In my
opinion its pilot was not aware he was crossing an approach path to a busy terminal.
Aircraft B crossing Newark runway 22 ILS final approach course at approxi-
mately 2500 ft. We were not advised about this aircraft. If we had been IFR it could
have been a bad scene — or even in limited visibility. The weather was CAVU.
Most such aircraft are simply trying to avoid the airport served by the instrument approach, and
such approaches are not depicted on VFR charts. The problem is a serious one for air carrier pilots,
who are usually attempting to slow to approach speed, perform final checklist items, and establish a
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stabilized approach at this position. The use of delayed flap procedures and consequent higher body
angles increases the difficulty of spotting light aircraft during final approaches.
Uncertainty as to an aircraft's position relative to the DME arc which defines the boundaries of
a TCA or TRSA is occasionally cited as the reason for intrusion into terminal airspace. Many general
aviation aircraft are not equipped with distance measuring equipment (DME), by which these blocks
of airspace are delineated. Landmarks which can serve the same purpose may be difficult to locate:
The reporter was examining some drainage ditches south of the Houston
Intercontinental Airport at about 800 ft AGL. He was well aware of the TCA's
8 DME radius, surface to 7000 ft, and felt he was well outside the confines of the
area. For this reason he did not contact the controlling agency. After completion of
the inspection, returning home, he believed he would be close to the airport traffic
area so he called the Tower to inform them of his position. They asked for his name
and address and informed him he had violated the TCA without a clearance. He
states that it is very difficult to judge distances at low altitude and that without
DME on board it is difficult in such an area as this to evaluate where the exact
borders of the TCA are.
A special problem at certain locations in the southwestern part of the United States is posed
by pilots whose comprehension of English is extremely limited. These pilots are sometimes not
prepared for the complexities of TRSA operations in a language with which they are unfamiliar:
Subject: Pilot's inability to comprehend English. Acft A called Tower 15 mi
south of airport. In accordance with stage III procedures he was told to contact
Tucson Approach Control. I observed acft A entering downwind southwest of
Tower with no radio contact. He entered downwind approximately 1 /2 mile ahead
of acft B in the pattern for 11R. Additional traffic was acft C on a right base for
11L. Acft B had to widen his pattern and extend his downwind to avoid acft A.
Then acft A turned northeast and paralleled acft C on base for 11 L. Acft A was
inside acft C preventing him from turning final. I then instructed acft C to make a
left 270° turn back onto final behind acft A. Both aircraft flew through the final
approach to 11 L. Radio contact with acft A was then established 1 mile north of the
airport. He was instructed to make a left turn to follow acft C.for 11L and did so
with no further problems. Two aircraft had to maneuver to avoid him.
It has been shown that in 50 cases in this sample, a common factor was the presence in a TCA
or TRSA of an aircraft which for one reason or another was not receiving stage III radar services.
The implications of and the reasons for this may be quite different in the two classes of airspace,
however.
Terminal control areas are prominently identified on both VFR and IFR charts; separate TCA
charts are published and easily available. Rules regarding operation in such areas are codified in
Federal Air Regulations and summarized in the Airman's Information Manual. Use of ATC services
within TCA's is mandatory for all aircraft. It seems reasonable to believe, therefore, that most pilots
are aware to some degree of the restrictions that apply to such areas. Uncontrolled aircraft in such
airspace should be rare.
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Terminal radar service areas, on the other hand, are not identified on VFR or IFR charts.
While they are shown in part 4 of the AIM and their existence has in the past been noted in part 3
under radar services, some of this information for satellite airports has been deleted in the
August 16, 1977 edition of AIM part 3. A general section on stage 111 services is contained in AIM
part 1 (see appendix C), but without access to AIM parts 3 and 4, it is difficult for pilots to know
whether a given terminal area does or does not provide stage III services.
Further, TRSA's may contain three types of traffic under visual meteorological conditions:
1. IFR aircraft (participants)
2. VFR aircraft (participants)
3. VFR aircraft (nonparticipants)
The information available to ATC about the third category may vary from none (primary target,
dimly visible, not communicating) to a good deal (mode C transponder-equipped, intentions
known). In this respect. TRSA airspace is exactly like all other low-altitude airspace with radar
coverage except TCA's: under VMC, the three categories of aircraft can exist anywhere in terminal
or enroute airspace, and radar advisories may be provided to VFR aircraft on request, workload
permitting. The only unique feature of the TRSA, then, is that separation from other known traffic
is provided to participating aircraft. The number of participants may also be greater by virtue of the
services offered. But the number of nonparticipants may also be>-large; as in other controlled
airspace, such nonparticipants may or may not be known to ATC.
Controller factors— Problems in air traffic control were believed to be primary factors in 38%
of the occurrences examined in this study (table 14. Human factors in this category included
handling problems, proficiency, training and supervision problems and interfacility coordination
problems; together these were cited as primary in 31 reports (about one-fourth of the sample).
The 31 human factors reports were reexamined in an effort to discern exactly what occurred,
and why. Table 17 summarizes the categories of behavior in these occurrences. Table 18 is a
summary of possible reasons for the behavior described in the 31 reports. It will be shown that
certain of these possible reasons were cited in many other reports as well.
There are many similarities between the elements in table 18 for controllers and those shown
in tables 14 and 16 for pilots. High flight crew workloads, particularly during the early phases of
departures and the latter phase of high-rate descents, can make maintenance of an adequate visual
scan of the environment extremely difficult. Such factors appeared to contribute to some of the
problems cited here:
Ontario weather 12000 scattered, 20000 scattered, 5 miles, smoke, haze.
Climbing out on the Prado 6 departure, had a near midair with a VFR (squawking
1400) light twin at 11,000 going eastbound. Communication was with Los Angeles
Center at the time and controller said he didn't see it and apologized, as other
aircraft was on 1400 code. Near midair was less than 200 ft; evasive action was
required. Notes: (1) Prado departure is through one of the heaviest routes of air
traffic in the USA. Local VFR, inbound and outbound VFR and IFR traffic into
LAX, LGB, SMO, and many others plus military traffic at March AFB. (2) In the
5 minutes after takeoff, besides flying the airplane, this departure required three
17
TABLE 17.- CONTROLLER FACTORS IN
TCA/TRSA OCCURRENCES
TABLE 18.- POSSIBLE REASONS FOR
CONTROLLER FACTORS IN TCA/TRSA
Factor
Information handling:
Did not note information
Noted information incorrectly
Forgot information
Failure of coordination
(information transfer)
Subtotal
Actions
Did not take action
Took incorrect action
Took action late
Failed to ensure separation
Subtotal
TOTAL
Number of reports
2
I
1
i9 i
1
13
4
9
2
3
18
31
OCCURRENCES
Possible reason
Human factors: controller
High workload
Inexperience/lack of familiarity
Misunderstanding of stage III service
Forgot pertinent information
Visual misidentification of aircraft
Misunderstood pilot's problem
Subtotal
-lu man factors: coordination
Transfer of converging traffic
Refused coordination
After coordination, took no action
Subtotal
Equipment factors
Environmental factors
Thunderstorms
Pop-up, no time for action
Subtotal
Unknown
TOTAL
Number of reports
3
3
2
2
1
1
—
12
2
1
1
—
4
4
1
1
-)
9
31
radio frequency changes, four changes in heading, and three altitude restrictions; in
the meantime, several callouts of conflicting traffic to watch for. Let's simplify these
departure procedures!
Similarly, the controller may be placed in a situation of extremely high workload, sometimes with
little opportunity to prepare for it. The existence of such situations is recognized both implicitly
and explicitly (par. 22a, FAA 7110.65, in appendix C):
Acft B on ILS 24R, acft A being vectored from south; parallel simultaneous
ILS approaches in progress. Acft B should have been level at 2500, acft B at 3500 or
above and turned onto the ILS prior to Century intersection to start parallel with
1000 ft vertical separation. Acft A was turned onto 25 L from the southeast along-
side acft B who was on 24R. Both acft were at 3500. Acft A was 3 miles from acft B
not established on the localizer and on a converging course. I issued an immediate
left turn to 180° and called traffic. By the time the courses diverged, the two
aircraft were about 2 miles apart. Both were inside Century at the turn. The
situation could have been alleviated if acft B had been at 2500 and if A was turned
on properly. But the person making the turn on was extremely busy and under
considerable pressure ...
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Inexperience or lack of familiarity with the environment of equipment can compound
problems by increasing an already high workload to the point of saturation. Again, this is seen in
both pilots and controllers, and the result is precisely the same in both groups: the person "falls
behind"; the ability to visualize the situation in real time and to think ahead of it is temporarily
lost:
At 1707 acft A called me approximately 25 miles northwest of Fort Wayne,
VFR, out of 9500 ft descending, with the ATIS information. I initially gave him a
descent at his discretion to 3000 ft and instructed him to plan on runway 31. At
1708 acft A requested an IFR clearance to VFR conditions through a cloud layer. I
cleared acft A to the Fort Wayne VOR via radar vectors to runway 31.1 then asked
acft A to report leaving 4500 ft. At 1710 I instructed acft A to maintain 4000 ft and
asked his altitude. He reported leaving 8000 ft. The pilot was outside my airspace
when I cleared him to descend; I was just becoming familiar with airspace allocations
and our new radar environment.
Misunderstanding of the intent, nature, and limitations of stage HI service appears to exist in
both pilots and controllers. In both groups, such misunderstanding threatens the effectiveness of the
service and imposes on the other member of the pilot-controller team the almost impossible task of
guessing what the other is going to do next:
LGA Tower cleared my aircraft to the George Washington bridge following
LGA rwy 22 departure, to maintain 1400 ft. Acft B southbound down the river
contacted the TCA on the same frequency and was directed to the GW bridge at
1400 ft. Neither aircraft was informed of the other; both were on the same side of
the river, and both were presumably in radar contact under the same controller.
When I complained about the controller's actions, he replied that the other aircraft
was VFR. Acft B was just outside the TCA, entering; I was just inside, departing.
Only alertness on the part of both pilots prevented a midair collision ...
Coordination — the transfer of information — between controllers, and between controller and
pilot, is an essential element of terminal radar programs. When such coordination breaks down,
whether because of an equipment problem, workload considerations, or a lack of comprehension by
one of what the other is saying, the system cannot work correctly:
Acft A was given left traffic for runway 11L by Tucson Approach Control on
stage III radar service. When aircraft called Tucson Tower, the controller told acft A
to report abeam the tower on left downwind. Acft A reported abeam the tower but
he was in right traffic. Acft A crossed the runways to make right traffic and
conflicted with acft B in right traffic. Acft A was changed to rwy 11R. Acft entered
short final for rwy 11L with acft C in position and tower controller had to reinstruct
acft A to land 11 R. Pilot seemed to have difficulty understanding English and what
he was instructed to do.
Traffic that is not visible or only dimly visible may not be noticed in the midst of other, more
luminous radar targets. "Pop-ups," or primary targets that are visualized only intermittently, were
involved in several of the potential conflicts in this sample of reports. In at least one case, the
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aircraft was equipped with a transponder and encoding altimeter but this equipment was activated
only after a conflict occurred:
Acft A appeared on radar over the outer marker, northbound, primary target.
Acft B departed on runway 22. Controller called "pop-up" traffic to acft B. Pilot of
acft B sighted the aircraft at approximately the same time. Acft B advised it was
close and about head-on at the same altitude. It was a single engine. After both
aircraft passed, the unknown traffic turned on his transponder and squawked VFR
1200, mode C. The unknown traffic never contacted approach control —
While many of these reports described radar service provided to and point-outs of nontransponder
equipped aircraft, there is little doubt that availability — and use — of a transponder, and encoding
altimeter if present, appreciably enhances the ability of controllers to provide radar services in
terminal areas. This is the case most especially when a pilot transgresses a TCA boundary, or when
he chooses to traverse a TRSA as a nonparticipant; in these cases transponder positional and
altitude information from the non-participating aircraft provides the controller with invaluable
information which he cannot otherwise obtain:
Acft A, an air carrier, heading 210, was descending from 8000 to 3000 in the
approach quadrant 13 miles east of STL for landing runway SOL. I observed a
non-identified VFR transponder with mode C indicating 6800 ft approximately 3 to
4 miles in front of acft A. Not knowing whether or not it was a false reply, I started
to issue traffic when I noticed the target was picked up by TCA. I immediately
advised A of this and noticed he was descending through 7300 to maintain 7000.
Not sure that A could level at 7000 I then issued a turn to 180°. The TCA controller
instructed acft B to descend to a lower altitude on a northwest heading. Once
assured of separation, the operation returned to normal. The VFR aircraft eventu-
ally landed at STL and was instructed to call the facility. The pilot advised he had
diverted from the east and after receiving ATIS, realized he had penetrated the STL
TCA.
Once again, mode C was the initial life-saver. Had the VFR aircraft not had
mode C, traffic would still have been issued to A (in most cases, traffic permitting),
but no altitude restriction or turn would have been issued because it would have
been thought the VFR aircraft was clear of the TCA. Therefore, A would probably
have descended into the VFR aircraft. As our first priority under 'Additional
Services/ traffic information is issued to all air carriers and other aircraft, time
permitting. VFR aircraft squawk 1200 and when in the TCA, a discrete code if
under radar control. Aircraft not under control are required to remain outside the
TCA — This is not always the case. VFR traffic around STL is extremely heavy.
Many of these aircraft do not have transponders and some do not even show up on
radar .. . Transponder-equipped aircraft, especially those with mode C, make it a
great deal easier for controller to see and avoid VFR aircraft, especially if they are
violating the TCA. Though the altitudes may not be verified, advisories or control
instructions to controlled aircraft can be issued.
Environmental factors: airspace— Many environmental factors are beyond the control of pilots
and controllers; they must simply be worked around. An example is thunderstorms; they make
20
provision of radar services appreciably more difficult and were a pertinent factor in several reports
in this sample. Some environmental factors, however, can be manipulated; among these is the
configuration of airspace allocated for terminal area control.
Airspace configuration determines to a considerable extent the behavior of pilots using the
space. The allocation, design and construction of terminal airspace areas may be comparatively
simple — when only one airport is being served, when terrain is comparatively flat, and when no
large areas of water exist to inhibit the flight of single-engine aircraft - or it may be extremely
difficult. Regardless of these factors', however, the design process has a great deal to do with how
effectively, and even whether, VFR pilots will utilize and cooperate with the ATC system serving
the airspace.
The New York TCA is an excellent if extreme example of the problems that face the airspace
designer. It is believed that a substantial fraction of the occurrences reported in this airspace were
motivated in part by these problems (fig. 1).
The complexity of the space called the New York Metroplex is caused by many factors, among
them the presence of three large and busy air carrier airports and several very busy general aviation
fields, the relatively narrow geographic confines of the metropolitan area, and water bounding the
area on the east. Virtually all of the low-altitude airspace within the TCA is used to provide even
minimally adequate approach and departure corridors for the three carrier airports. Unfortunately,
these factors in combination have produced a situation in which there is virtually no overland
airspace provided for VFR general aviation aircraft traversing the area from south to northeast or
vice versa. The situation is particularly acute for light .aircraft enroute to or from satellite general
aviation airports on Long Island. When weather conditions permit, these aircraft may utilize a
shallow corridor just off-shore, but the use of this airspace poses potential hazards if J. F. Kennedy
airport jet traffic is landing on runway 4 (fig. 2):
... The TCA south of JFK is referred to by controllers as area B ... this area
was structured, I am told, so that the General Aviation community can get to and
leave Long Island area airports, below the TCA, over land. On the date of this
report, I observed 27 such aircraft using this method of transiting the TCA east and
west along the south shore of Long Island. Two problems exist, however. First,
when traffic is landing on runways 4 at JFK, light aircraft may find themselves less
than 1000 ft below a heavy jet inbound to the runways (the outer markers are just
in from the shoreline). If the glide slope goes out and we are using non-precision
approaches, the margin could be even less. The first problem is a potential conflict if
the carrier descends rapidly and the light airplane is a little high — the second
problem is wake turbulence. Eighty percent of our traffic is heavy jets ... I suggest
that the aircraft using this space be instructed to call Kennedy Tower transiting this
area so we can advise them of whether 4L/R are in use — this would take the
surprise out of the operation ...
It is also a classic example of an airspace configuration that tends to force a substantial volume of
general aviation traffic into a constrained corridor of airspace. Numerous such de facto corridors
exist, for a variety of reasons. Another in the New York area is the "Hudson River corridor,"
extending from the surface to 1099ft. (Its upper bound is imposed, among other things, by the
La Guardia runway 13 ILS glide path.) While this corridor is higher, it is only as wide as the river
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Figure 1.— New York Terminal Control Area.
\Figure 2.- New York TCA: Southeast portion showing approach to Long Island.
and offers few reasonable spots for a forced landing. Aircraft tend to use only the upper few
hundred feet of the corridor:
Acft A eastbound over Hudson River at 1200 ft in radar contact with TCA
controller and in the TCA on routine flight into Manhattan. Passenger raised hand to
point at aircraft B approaching from our 9 o'clock position. Range at my first
sighting perhaps 75 yards, same altitude. Immediately initiated right descending turn
and noticed that at the same time acft B dropped its right wing and turned behind
me. It is difficult to say for sure but I feel that without evasive action a collision
would have been likely. LGA TCA controller advised no radio or radar contact with
other aircraft ... Hudson River corridor is heavily traveled by all manner of aircraft
with little apparent regard for proximity to TCA limits.
Another problem in configuring terminal airspace is the proximity of hub and satellite airports.
This problem exists in New York, further complicating the task of FAA airspace planners. The
"Flushing cut," an indentation in the TCA to well within the La Guardia airport control zone, was
provided to permit general aviation traffic to utilize Flushing without becoming involved with the
TCA, but there are still problems due simply to the physical proximity of the two airports, the
overlying TCA, and the high traffic density in the area (fig. 2):
During my approach to Flushing Airport from the south, I was vectored to the
Throgs Neck bridge and was told to make a left 180° turn to enter left traffic for the
active runway. Radar service was terminated. While I am not certain whether there
was a misunderstanding or just incorrect instructions by the controller, the fact
remains that a right-hand traffic pattern was appropriate. I consulted my charts and
noticed that a left-hand traffic pattern would put me back into the TCA. After
considering this, I returned to the other side of the airport and landed out of
right-hand traffic. I feel that the extremely close proximity of this airport to
La Guardia, one of the busiest in the country, is in and of itself quite dangerous and
requires extra precautions, specifically on the part of ATC.
A similar problem exists at Linden, New Jersey. The airport is uncontrolled, provides aeronautical
advisory service on 122.80MHz (Unicom), and underlies a portion of the New York TCA whose
floor makes it difficult to overfly the field to ascertain wind and traffic conditions. Frequency
congestion on 122.80 is such that it is often difficult to obtain such information by radio. The
approaching pilot is thus faced" with the dilemma of either penetrating the TCA and being required
to forego at least a listening watch on Unicom frequency or waiting outside the traffic area for
considerable periods of time trying to get information before entering the pattern (fig. 3).
While New York poses a difficult combination of problems, especially for general aviation
aircraft, it is only one example of such areas. Problems associated with airspace configuration tend
to fall into one of four classes. The class of corridor problems has been mentioned. The other classes
relate to upper boundaries of terminal airspace, lateral boundaries of such airspace, and the
proximity of satellite airports. Each will be discussed briefly here.
Other "corridors" — either formally established, as in Los Angeles, or de facto because of VFR
flight patterns — exist in the vicinity of TCA's at San Francisco, Dallas-Ft. Worth, and Chicago. Two
examples most often cited in ASRS reports are the area beneath the TCA shelf east of San
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Figure 3.— New York TCA: Southwest detail showing Linden Airport.
Francisco Bay, and the area beneath the TCA shelf east and north of Dallas-Ft. Worth. The former
area is a problem because of the very considerable concentration of general aviation traffic in the
Bay area and the hills directly east of the TCA (fig. 4). The latter is a problem because of the very
large amount of air traffic flying between Love Field and points north and west (fig. 5). This traffic,
a mix of reciprocating, turboprop; and turbojet traffic, is further constrained at certain times during
the year by thunderstorm activity, a frequent occurrence in the Dallas area. In the Chicago area, the
presence of high towers in the uncontrolled airspace beneath a TCA shelf leaves little maneuvering
room for pilots attempting to minimize the distance of their flight (fig. 6). In several of these areas
at night, the large concentrations of lights on the surface in these metropolitan areas makes it
extremely difficult to visualize the lights of other aircraft. During the day, industrial smog and haze
impairs visibility. In some areas, aircraft not equipped with DME may have difficulty remaining
outside the TCA lateral boundaries by reference to surface, landmarks.
The problem of proximity of satellite airports has been mentioned in connection with Flushing
Airport. Another satellite airport whose proximity to a hub field has caused problems is Bowman
Field, Louisville, Kentucky. This field has active VFR traffic and a considerable number of
students. Its traffic patterns are close to certain approaches to Standiford Field, Louisville's air
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Figure 5.— Dallas-Ft. Worth TCA showing relationship of Love Field to boundary.
11
Figure 6.— Chicago TCA detail showing high towers beneath west shelf.
carrier hub. Louisville has a stage III TRSA; participation is not mandatory. Both general aviation
and nonparticipating air carrier aircraft have been involved in occurrences in the immediate vicinity
of Bowman Field:
Airline aircraft on final approach into Louisville Airport reported that he
missed a light aircraft by only 20 ft. Position was about 3 miles on final approach.
Controller pointed aircraft out but pilots of airliner did not see in time to initiate
evasive action. Why this incident occurred: (1) Possible lack of training in pilots to
identify themselves while flying in controlled airspace and in particular when in the
path of aircraft making instrument approaches; (2) Airports with overlapping traffic
patterns without compatible runway use programs . ..
Other cases at other locations have involved a military aircraft that cut across a TRSA
departure path on an emergency descent to its home field, and another military aircraft that was
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unable to make good a SID crossing restriction due to high ambient temperature; it entered an
adjoining TRSA.
ASRS reports have described potential conflicts during VFR overflights of the Cleveland,
Chicago, New York, Los Angeles, and Dallas-Ft. Worth TCA's. In order to avoid the communication
and vectoring workload associated with transit through a TCA, or because of difficulty in obtaining
clearance through the area, many pilots flying under visual flight rules choose to overfly the upper
boundary of the TCA. Unfortunately, turbojet aircraft usually enter and depart the TCA through
this airspace: the routes in use are often not known to the overflying pilot. Climb and descent rates
of the larger aircraft may exceed 3000 ft/min (50 ft/sec) at a speed of 250 knots: near midair
collisions have resulted:
Airliner was slowing to 160 knots per ATC. Instructions were: "Stop turn at
300°, slow to 160 knots ... traffic at 12 o'clock less than a mile, altitude
unknown." Traffic wa's immediately observed head-on, same altitude (10,700 MSL).
Airliner ducked under with a right turn. Estimated miss distance 1300—1500ft.
Controller was very busy working heavy traffic to two parallel runways. His not
required call-out was timely; we thanked him for the 'save.'
Airline acft A was on vectors, heading 360° assigned by O'Hare Approach
Control and descending through 7200 to 4000 ft when the copilot noticed a light
aircraft B at our 2 o'clock position westbound coming from over the lake at our
altitude, very close. Both aircraft banked to avoid striking. Estimate miss at approxi-
mately 100 yards. We were not given traffic information by approach and asked
them if they could paint the other traffic after the miss. They were unable . . .
(It is pointed out by reporters that VFR overflights often represent attempts to avoid
prolonged overwater flights or protracted diversions. This is especially true at Boston, New York.
Miami, Los Angeles, and San Francisco. Although extending the TCA's upward to the floor of the
continental control area may prevent some conflicts above the present TCA's, as suggested by
several reporters, it will do nothing to accommodate the needs of the general aviation pilot.)
One special boundary problem, a TCA bounded by two TRSA's, has been described to ASRS.
It was pointed out that the configuration of the Dulles-Washington-Baltimore complex, and the
charts that describe the airspace, tend to favor pilots communicating with Washington approach
control, during which time they may traverse the Dulles or Baltimore TRSA's as nonparticipants. A
report, alert bulletin, and its response regarding this problem are presented:
Aircraft within Dulles airspace receive stage III with 15 miles of Dulles airport
and advisories to 25 miles. This provides separation between known aircraft ...
aircraft flying within Dulles airspace unknown to IAD controllers are in fact known
to Washington Approach Control. The Washington TCA VFR sectional map depicts
Washington frequencies in Dulles airspace. Pilots requesting service prior to entry
into the DCA TCA are thus encouraged to call Washington instead of Dulles. This
results in two aircraft with less than standard separation ...
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Text of Alert Bulletin:
Airspace controlled by Dulles Intl. Airport and Baltimore-Washington Intl.
Airport ATC Facilities: Confusion and a potential conflict situation have been
reported involving VFR traffic transiting IAD and BWI airspace enroute to Washing-
ton National Airport. Even though aircraft in the IAD and BWI airspace can
voluntarily receive stage HI service and advisories, many pilots elect to communicate
only with DCA controllers in anticipation of their entry into or while exiting the
DCA TCA. It is suggested (by the reporter) that this condition of pilots in one
controller's airspace talking to controllers working other airspace is inadvertently
encouraged by the VFR terminal Area Chart's instructions to contact DCA frequen-
cies while in IAD and BWI airspace.
Text of Response:
The Washington VFR Terminal Area Chart has been amended to improve the
reported situation. Information boxes for pilots to contact Washington Approach
Control on appropriate frequencies have been relocated. Additional boxes have been
added on the Baltimore and Dulles areas which read: "VFR TRAFFIC TRANSIT-
ING TRSA ARE REQUESTED TO CONTACT APPROACH
CONTROL ON (FREQUENCY)." These changes will provide more accurate infor-
mation for pilots' use.
(Note: This is not an isolated problem. AIM part 4 graphics for Los Angeles do not identify the
adjoining Burbank TRSA, which could lead pilots into a similar trap. The use of effective
coordination and handoff procedures can minimize the seriousness of the problem, but presentation
of appropriate information on VFR charts would be at least equally effective. TRSA's are not
depicted on these charts at present, and their presentation in AIM part 4 does not follow a standard
format.)
Table 19 summarizes 14 reports in this series: 9 in which a terminal area boundary problem
was thought to be a primary factor, and 5 in which a boundary problem was a pertinent secondary'
factor.
TABLE 19.- TERMINAL AREA BOUNDARY PROBLEMS
Airspace
TRSA
TRSA
TCA
TCA
TCA
TRSA
TCA
TCA
TCA
TCA
TCA
TCA
TCA
TCA
Location
SDF
PHX
DFW
CLE
LGA
SAN
DFW
EWR
HOU
LGA
LGA
ORD
DCA
DFW
Boundary
Lateral
Lateral
Lateral
Upper
Lateral
Lateral
Shelf
Floor
Lateral
Floor
Floor
Upper
Lateral
Lateral
Nature of problem
Proximity of SDF and LOU
Proximity of Luke Dpt pattern
Proximity of Love Field (1)
VFR overflight. A/C descending
Proximity of LGA and Flushing Aprs
Proximity of NAS North Island
Conflict across boundary
Proximity of Linden Airport
Landmarks
Tfc over Hudson River
Tfc over Hudson River
VFR overflight, A/C descending
Interface problem: see text
Proximity of Love Field (2)
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Equipment factors— Four types of equipment factors were cited in these reports. Ground-
based radar and computer-enhanced (ARTS) equipment were cited as contributing factors in a
number of occurrences. The absence of and malfunctions of airborne transponders were also
described. A few reports mentioned other airborne avionics failures. Table 20 summarizes these
citations.
Inability to make or maintain contact with primary targets accounted for over one-third of the
equipment citations. There are many possible reasons for such an inability on the part of a
controller. As mentioned previously, the target may be there but may go unnoticed for a time. The
radar gain may be set at a low level to minimize ground clutter which minimizes primary targets as
well. Thermal inversions and other atmospheric phenomena can appreciably degrade the perfor-
mance of even a well-tuned radar unit:
... Primary radar at the facility was poor with temperature inversion and clutter and
some cancellation problems. AFS was working on the radar at the time to improve
the presentation ...
TABLE 20.- EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
Equipment problem
A. Ground equipment: radar
1. Radar inoperative
2. Unable to make/maintain contact
3. Environmental problem
4. Targets lost in central blind spot
Subtotal
B. Ground equipment: ARTS System
1. ARTS inoperative: primary radar only
2. ARTS malfunction, not specified
3. ARTS tag drop, false target,
target swap, etc.
Subtotal
C. Airborne equipment: transponder
1. Transponder inoperative
2. Mode C inaccurate
Subtotal
D. Other airborne equipment
1. Communications, radios
2. VOR navigation receiver inoperative
Subtotal
TOTAL
Number of reports
2
11
1
1
3
2
2
1
2
1
15
10
3
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Certain light aircraft, and some military aircraft, present only a very small reflective surface,
especially when head-on to the transmitted radar beam. Regardless of which of these factors may
have been responsible, 10 of the 11 reports involved near midair collisions in which the other
aircraft was in contact with ATC. It can be assumed that transponder-enhanced targets would have
been painted more clearly by the radar and thus detected more easily by the controller.
ARTS computer problems were cited in 10 cases. A total failure or serious malfunction,
placing reliance on broadband radar, was mentioned as a contributory factor in 5 occurrences. In
the other 5 cases, tag drops, false targets, and target swapping were described. These subtle failures
are more difficult for a busy controller to detect, and thus are more likely to lure the controller into
making an error:
The first aircraft, acft A, was vectored to ILS 27 R at PHL with an acft B in
trail. When acft A was approximately at the outer marker, I asked the Tower if they
could circle acft A to rwy 17, as acft B was 3 miles in trail. Tower advised rwy 17
was closed. 1 then asked if they could take the two acft with present separation.
They said "okay, we'll put one on 27L and one on 27R." They then asked if the
acft had each other in sight and I said "no." At this time I turned acft B over to the
Tower. Several moments later (perhaps 2 minutes) the ARTS tag dropped from
acft A and I could not see a primary target on the acft. Acft B was on about a 2-mile
final with an ARTS tag. I called the Tower and asked if they had either acft in sight
and they replied "no." At this time I told the Tower to give acft B a missed
approach. ..
While the air traffic control system has backup modes of operation designed to compensate for
each of these types of failures, the very reliability of the radar and computer equipment tends to
place the controller at a disadvantage when a failure occurs, especially a subtle failure. Controllers,
like pilots, learn after a time to rely on the continued correct functioning of devices that usually
function correctly. This places them at a disadvantage for a short time if the equipment fails.
Perhaps more important, their level of alertness respecting subtle failures is lowered after a long
period without them. Man does not function well as a monitor when he must look for events with a
low probability of occurrence. In the absence of information to verify the existence of a false
target, the controller may be unable to check the validity of the information he is processing. It is in
this situation that the queries of a suspicious pilot may be invaluable, for such queries will usually
lead the controller to question what his data sources are telling him:
Acft A called Denver Approach for TCA clearance and landing at Denver. He
was assigned a descent beacon code and acquired an ARTS tag 35 miles northwest of
the airport. He was given radar contact and cleared direct to the Denver VOR. The
beacon and ARTS tag was good and steady. At 25 miles northwest of the airport the
aircraft was assigned a heading of 090° to go around the BJC airport area. The pilot
questioned the heading and stated it would take him away from the airport. The
aircraft was told to ident and verify heading and was given its position. The tagged
target idented and checked well on beacon readout. After further checking, how-
ever, the aircraft was really 25 northeast of Denver with discrete beacon readout.
The false target was tagged with a good readout.
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Airborne equipment problems included two cases of radio trouble, one incorrect position due
to a faulty navigation receiver (the pilot intruded into a TCA without clearance), and an incorrect
encoding altimeter readout which led to a conflict between two aircraft, both under control of
ATC.
ATC procedures and policies— Two areas which relate to ATC procedures and policies were
identified in these data. The first has also been the subject of Alert Bulletins which are extracted
below. It is the responsibility of the VFR pilot to "maintain appropriate terrain and obstruction
clearance" at all times. At the same time, a VFR pilot participating in a terminal radar service
program "must maintain an altitude when assigned by ATC." Assignment of radar headings, routes
or altitudes is based on the provision that a pilot operating under visual flight rules is expected to
advise ATC if compliance will cause him to violate any Federal Air Regulations. Further, VFR
aircraft may be vectored regardless of altitude. It is the responsibility of the pilot to comply with
the provisions of any applicable Federal Air Regulations. (Extracted from AIM and ATC Handbook;
see appendix C for context.)"
Three reports in this series, and others previously cited in alert bulletins, indicate that pilots
continue to receive clearances at or to altitudes below minimum vectoring altitudes off published
routes. It has been pointed out previously that at night, or under conditions of reduced visibility
during the day, pilots may not be able both to maintain an assigned altitude or heading and to
maintain appropriate terrain and obstruction clearance. This problem has been reported with
respect to the Las Vegas and Denver TCA's and the Tucson TRSA; unrestricted clearances at or to
below minimum safe altitude or minimum vectoring altitude have been received from other
approach control facilities. It is believed, as acknowledged by FAA in the response quoted below,
that this is a system problem which may need correction at a national level:
Text of Alert Bulletin:
Las Vegas TCA: Pilot on night flight into LAS on VFR flight plan, no moon,
called for clearance into the TCA from over Boulder City at 5000 ft. He was cleared
direct to LAS airport to descend to 3500 ft at pilot's discretion. After clearing
mountains he descended to 3500 ft, was then given turn to 340. He became
concerned about terrain clearance because of obstruction lights ahead, requested
MSA three times, was then told 4800 ft. After landing, he was informed VFR traffic
is responsible for terrain clearance regardless of radar vectors in a TCA. He states
that when radar vectors take a pilot off a published route at night, it may not be
possible to know the minimum safe altitude and adhere to AIM part 1 admonition
to maintain appropriate terrain and obstruction clearance, since radar vectoring
altitudes may differ from information available to pilots. This is the second report of
this potential area of misunderstanding with respect to Las Vegas TCA. In both
reports, vectors and assigned altitude of 3500 ft took pilots into areas where terrain
clearance was not assured.
Text of Response:
We have investigated procedures at Las Vegas in response to the Aviation
Safety Report, The following actions have been taken by the Western Region Air
Traffic Division:
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1. Las Vegas Tower shall not assign an altitude to a VFR aircraft that is below
the minimum safe altitude as defined in FAR 91.79.
2. Las Vegas Tower shall not assign a VFR nighttime departure an altitude that
is below the appropriate minimum vectoring altitude.
Las Vegas Tower will issue a facility directive containing these instructions.
In a subsequent communication, FAA advised this matter is under further
review for possible national application of revised procedures for the handling of
VFR traffic in terminal control areas.
A second, more subtle problem relates to the policies that govern the control of aircraft within
terminal radar service areas (including terminal control areas).
The statements in appendix C make it quite plain that the provision of radar traffic informa-
tion is an additional service, to be provided when workload permits. The provision of radar
vectoring and radar or visual separation of participating aircraft in stage III service, however, appears
to be mandatory, although under visual meteorological conditions, pilots are also responsible for
seeing and avoiding other traffic.
Pilots who request radar traffic information service, either explicitly or by voluntary or
mandatory participation in terminal radar programs, appear to believe that as a minimum, they will
receive at least radar safety advisories on a continuing basis. They do not appear to understand that
"an awareness of situations involving unsafe proximity to uncontrolled aircraft cannot be man-
dated . . ." Still less do they understand that radar traffic information may be provided, then
discontinued without notice. Pilots of aircraft operating under instrument flight rules in particular
do not understand why point-outs of potentially conflicting VFR aircraft are not routinely given
them.
Notwithstanding the "workload permitting" nature of traffic advisory service, participating
pilots, especially in a stage III environment, expect that separation and traffic advisories will be
provided. They do not know, of course, whether a potentially conflicting aircraft is a participant, or
even whether it is visible to the controller handling their flight.
Table 21 lists 19 cases in this series in which an advisory ("point-out") was not issued. In
17 cases, less than standard separation was reported; separation was 500 ft or less in 13 cases. In
5 cases, the other aircraft was said not to have been observed on radar or to have been seen only
after the conflict. In two cases, the controller stated he was unable to provide a point-out because
of workload; in at least 4 cases, both aircraft were under ATC control.
It is clear from these data that in several cases, the aircraft not pointed out was a primary
target which was not seen by the controller. In other cases, it is likely that the controller's other
duties precluded a point-out. In many other reports in this series, of course, a timely point-out was
issued to one or both pilots. Some of these point-outs were said to have prevented almost certain
collisions and prompted expressions of deep gratitude by the reporting pilots.
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TABLE 21.- FAILURE TO POINT OUT/UNABLE TO DETECT TRAFFIC
Reporter
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
C
Area
TCA
TRSA
TRSA
TRSA
TRSA
TCA
TRSA
TCA
TCA
TCA
m. TCA
TRSA
TCA
TRSA
TCA
TCA
TRSA
TRSA
TRSA
Aircraft A
AC1FR
AC1FR
ACIFR
ACIFR
GAIFR
ACIFR
ACIFR
GA VFR
? IFR
GAIFR
G A I F R
GAVFR
GAIFR
ACIFR
GAIFR
GAIFR
ACIFR
? IFR
ACIFR
Aircraft B
GAVFR
GAVFR
GAVFR
7
GAVFR
GAVFR
GAVFR
7
GAVFR
GA ?
GAVFR
7
GAVFR
GAVFR
GAVFR
GA VFR
GAVFR
7
GAVFR
Outcome
NMAC-NT
LTSS
NMAC-EA
NMAC-EA
LTSS
NMAC-EA
NMAC-EA
NMAC-EA
500 ft sep
•>
LTSS-EA
NMAC-NT
LTSS
NMAC-EA
LTSS
NMAC-NT
NMAC-?
NMAC-?
NMAC-?
Comments
B no radio contact
B no radar contact
B no radar contact
Both working ATC
B at TCA boundary
Both working ATC
B seen after call
Both working ATC
Non-participating.
mode C
Both working ATC
Too busy for point-out
Too busy for point-out
B overtook A
Controller apologized
Not seen on radar
Code: P:
AC:
IFR:
NMAC:
EA:
piloi
air carrier
instrument flight rules
near midair collision
evasive action
C: controller
GA: general aviation
VFR: visual flight rules
LTSS: less than standard separation
NT: no time for evasive action
Herein lies the insidiousness of this problem. Pilots know they are in a radar environment and
that the primary purpose of the radar is to facilitate separation of aircraft. If VFR, they are urged
to participate in the radar-based system. They are encouraged to request traffic advisory service. Yet
they have no way to determine at any particular moment the extent to which they can expect to
receive the services for which they asked from the system in which they are participating.
Unfortunately, most pilots are unaware of the coordination tasks often required of the air
traffic controller. If the frequency they are guarding is relatively quiet, they assume the controller's
workload is light enough to permit him to provide them with traffic advisories. While many pilots
are now aware that primary targets are more difficult to track than beacon returns, few are aware of
the multiplicity of variables that influences the performance of radar, or the performance of the
controller working their flight.
On the other hand, the tasks required of the pilot in terminal airspace may also impose a high
workload, especially under circumstances of marginal visibility. Point-outs of possibly conflicting
traffic can be most helpful in moderating that workload, as is evident from many comments in these
reports.
Pilots flying under instrument flight rules (16 of the 19 cases in table 21) find it particularly
hard to understand that not all of the traffic around them is necessarily known or observed traffic.
35
They do not appear to understand the caveats stated in the AIM 1 section on Radar Safety
Advisories.
However clear the policies regarding radar services are to those who enunciated them, there
appears to be a serious problem of misunderstanding in this area. Pilots, like all other humans,
function most effectively in a relatively stable, certain environment, or at any rate in one whose
uncertainty is known to them (the known uncertainty of weather forecasts is an example). Reliance
to any degree on a service whose elements and extent vary unpredictably causes uncertainty and
anxiety which are reflected in many of the critical comments in these reports.
It also appears that at least some controllers are uncertain as to the basic policies regarding
terminal radar services. An example is provided of a situation in which the controller appeared to
misunderstand the philosophy underlying the service. Others will be found elsewhere in this section:
I was flying on a VFR flight plan from Norwood, Mass to Reading, Pa, cruising
at 6500 ft with Boston radar advisory service. I was turned over to La Guardia radar
advisory service near New Haven, Ct and they approved my continuing flight
through the NY TCA over Westchester and the Tappan Zee bridge. La Guardia was
in communication with another airplane, also (the one I nearly collided with). I was
told on approximately three occasions from about 7 miles east of the bridge to the
bridge area that I had traffic at 9 o'clock. Both I and the other aircraft were asked to
ident. When over the center of the Tappan Zee bridge at 6500 ft I heard the other
pilot tell the controller that he was over the center of the Tappan Zee bridge at
6500 ft. 1 then told LGA that I was also over the bridge at 6500 ft. La Guardia had
us both ident separately. La Guardia then told us that we were both in about the
same place and asked if we couldn't see each other. I replied that I could not see my
traffic, then told the controller that I was going to make a very gradual right turn up
the Hudson in an attempt to get away from the other aircraft. I got no reply. I
looked out my right window and proceeded. Halfway through the turn my plane
bounced, indicating to me that I had either hit wake turbulence or the other
airplane. I told La Guardia of this and requested permission to descend for a landing
to gather my composure. I do not recall whether I got a reply or not. I landed and
found no damage to the aircraTt, and then finished my flight to Reading.
General Discussion
Reports submitted to the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System have limitations as a source
of data for studies of this kind. Since the System is voluntary, one cannot evaluate whether these
reports are a representative sample of occurrences in terminal airspace. One cannot, therefore, state
whether potential conflicts are or are not common in such airspace. ASRS reports may be
considered representative of a reporter's perception of an occurrence, but the accuracy of that
perception cannot be judged because the System has no means to verify the facts of an occurrence
by independent investigation.
What, then, is the value of such reports? Can the data contained in them be used to advance
aviation safety? The study reported here represents a first attempt to construct a model for the use
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of such reports for this purpose, notwithstanding the limitations set forth above. Since it is the first
such study, a short discussion of these questions is in order.
It will be argued that at best, ASRS reports, containing the perceptions of but a single person,
are an imperfect picture of the real world. This is quite true, but it is also true that these
perceptions are what motivate the decisions made by these persons. If their perceptions are
incorrect, the decisions made and actions taken by these controllers and pilots are also apt to be
incorrect. Thus, in certain respects, perceptions of those working in the aviation system are as
important as the reality, and when such perceptions are wrong, the reasons for them should be
explored.
In this study, little use has been made of numerical data except to determine whether a
particular phenomenon should be studied. The study thereafter must deal with stated or hypothe-
sized factors associated with a particular phenomenon. A potential strength of the Aviation Safety
Reporting System is that it-relies only on the data actually present, yet permits the study of fairly
considerable bodies of data related to a particular question.
In this study, as in earlier ones, it is clear that information transfer in the aviation system is an
extremely important factor in how well the system operates. Lack of knowledge of the procedures
and limitations of radar service, problems in communications, lack of information as to the altitude
and position of nonparticipating aircraft, lack of information regarding instrument approach paths
at hub airports, limited comprehension of English, and failures of coordination among ATC
facilities, all represent problems of information transfer, whether from manuals or charts or from
one person to another.
Another major factor which appeared to be associated with problems in this study was that of
airspace configuration. The shape, design and use of airspace appear to influence pilot and even
controller behavior in many of the occurrences selected for this study. Once again, the availability
of information concerning these factors may have been a part of the problem in several instances.
The final factor demonstrated in this study, that of misunderstanding of policies, rules or
procedures, is again a function of information transfer within the aviation system. It seems clear
that in at least some cases, pilots simply did not understand what was expected of them and that in
many other cases, they did not understand why the system is operated as it is. Such misunderstand-
ings demonstrate, if nothing else, the validity of the earlier comments regarding the importance of
perceptions as a determinant of behavior.
Conclusions
It is concluded that a systematic investigation of information transfer problems in terminal
radar service areas and terminal control areas would be productive and would be likely to point out
areas in which procedural or system modifications would enhance aviation safety.
It is concluded that existing methods of dissemination of information regarding TRSA and
TCA airspace boundaries and procedures are not optimal and that a study of available methods for
dissemination of such information may be useful. In particular, information concerning TRSA's and
their boundaries is not readily available to pilots.
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It is concluded that a better understanding of the rationale, policies and recommended
procedures for the use of terminal radar services by both general aviation and air carrier pilots
would enhance the safety and effectiveness of the system. In particular, a better understanding of
why the system works as it does, and especially of its limitations, would be of benefit. Air traffic
controllers also need to be fully aware of the rationale, as well as the methods, of terminal radar
programs, and of the needs of all classes of pilots who may utilize airspace designated for these
programs.
DISCUSSION AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Aviation Safety Reporting System intake throughout its first year remained comparatively
constant at just over 105 reports per week. The system has been utilized steadily during this year;
the quality of many reports has been outstanding. Many problems, some minor, some serious, have
been brought to light in a frank dialogue between the users of the National Aviation System and
those responsible for managing that system. The ASRS staff wishes to express its gratitude to all of
the pilots, controllers and others who have given generously of their time and expertise through the
submission of reports. We shall do our utmost during the coming year to be worthy of the
continued support of the aviation community. We also wish to acknowledge with appreciation the
assistance of Miss Jan Bennett, of the FAA Office of Aviation Safety, whose name was inadver-
tently omitted from the acknowledgments in our third Quarterly Report.
The managers and staff of the ASRS solicit, and will be responsive to, comments and criticisms
from readers of these reports. Such comments should be directed to:
Charles E. Billings, M.D., Chief
Aviation Safety Research Office, 239-3
Ames Research Center, NASA
Moffett Field, California 94035
Ames Research Center
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Moffett Field, California 94035, September 22, 1977
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APPENDIX A
EXAMPLES OF ALERT BULLETINS AND RESPONSES
INDEX
Bulletin
no. Subject Page
AIR NAVIGATION
1 Pilot's discretion descents 41
2 Altitudes during instrument approaches 41
3 Profile descent charts and communications 42
4 Charting of missed approach procedures 43
5 Airfilingof IFR flight plans 43
6 Confusion of intersection names 44
AIRPORTS: FACILITIES AND MAINTENANCE
7 Standard communications after landing 44
8 Jet blast in aircraft parking area 45
9 Taxiway configuration and lighting 45
10 Unmarked fence bordering runup area 45
11 Tower cab windows •. 46
AIRPORTS: LIGHTING AND APPROACH AIDS
12 Runway markings and VASI 46
13 Problem with parallel runway operations 47
14 Nondirectional beacon reception problems 48
15 Nondirectional beacon power and location 48
16 Localizer signal variability - . 48
17 ILS switching procedures 48
18 ATIS notification of runway(s) in use 49
19 Approach light settings . 49
-v
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL FACILITIES AND PROCEDURES
20 ARTCC radar problem 50
21 Terminal radar beacon problem 51
22 Coordination of traffic-nonstandard route 51
23 Emergency frequency availability 52
24 Availability of altimeter settings . . . 52
HAZARDS TO FLIGHT
25 Landings on intersecting runways 53
26 Availability of climb gradient data 53
27 Icing on west slopes of Cascade Mountains 55
28 Obstructions on final approach 55
39
Bulletin
no. Subject Page
MILITARY-CIVIL COORDINATION
29 Notification of training route use 56
30 Coordination concerning military SI D's 56
31 Conflicts in terminal area 37
32 Excursions from military operations area 57
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Previous ASRS Quarterly Reports contained examples of Alert Bulletins generated on the basis
of reports submitted to the ASRS. Because the Alert Bulletin procedure is a vital element of the
ASRS concept, and because many Alert Bulletins and the responses to them produce information of
benefit to the aviation community, an additional sampling of Alert Bulletins and responses by the
FAA and other aviation interests is provided in this appendix to the Fourth Quarterly Report. The
bulletins have been categorized to assist the reader in locating those bulletins of particular interest
to him: the classification is shown in the index to this appendix.
AIR NAVIGATION
This general category includes examples of possible problems associated with (1) procedures
following communications between pilots and ATC personnel (refs. 1,2); (2) profile descent charts
and communications (ref. ?); (3) instrument approach chart depictions of missed approach pro-
cedures (ref. 4); (4) in-flight filing of IFR flight plans (ref. 5); and (5) the possible confusion
surrounding ainvay intersections with similar sounding names (ref. 6).
1. Text of AB: Various locations: Misunderstandings appear to exist on the part of both
controllers and pilots as to the timeliness of actions initiating altitude changes after issuance by
ATC. Reports of potential conflicts have been received wherein the issue seems to be the length of
time following an ATC instruction to climb or descend before the pilot actually initiates the change
in altitude. Unlike change of direction instructions issued by ATC, which are generally acknowl-
edged with immediate compliance, an element of flexibility exists with regard to responses to
altitude change instructions. One reporter suggests that the following addition to ATP 7110.65
paragraph 233, would assist in resolving the problem: "All altitude changes shall be commenced
promptly unless the controller specifically states that the change is at the pilot's discretion."
Text of Response: AIM Part 11, page 1-49, paragraph 6 (Adherence to Clearances) contains
five examples indicating pilot responsibilities in complying with various descent clearances. Addi-
tionally, paragraph 7 of the same section states: "when ATC has not used the term 'at pilot's
discretion' nor imposed any climb/descent restrictions, pilots should initiate climb or descent
promptly on acknowledgment of the clearance." These requirements appear to be quite explicit and
would seem to eliminate the possibility of any misunderstanding.
Insertion of the suggested statement in 7110.65, 233, would serve no useful purpose since that
document prescribes ATC procedures for use by personnel providing air traffic control services and
does not purport to delineate procedures to be used by pilots.
However, in view of the possibility of misunderstanding, identified in the NASA Aviation
Safety Report, we plan to call both pilots' and controllers' attention to the procedures in AIM
Part 1 via a letter to the users and an ATS Bulletin article.
2. Text of AB: Various locations: Recent reports received from controllers contain expres-
sions of concern regarding the possible existence of a misconception, particularly among general
aviation pilots, relating to what altitude the pilot may descend to when the clearance reads
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"... cleared for approach to XXX." Several reporters note that pilots may believe that with this
clearance they can descend to the procedure turn altitude for that approach once they are
established anywhere inside the approach chart's circled area (usually 10 plus or minus miles from
the airport). This information suggests the need for pilots to review the provisions of FARs 91.1 16
and 91.119, as well as those sections of AIM Part 1 dealing with ATC clearances and instrument
approach procedures.
Text of Response: We concur with the recommendation that pilots review FARs 91.1 16
and 91.119 as well as the AIM if they have any question in regard to what altitude they may
descend to once they have been "cleared for approach."
Air traffic control procedures are quite specific (Handbook 7110.65-794) for the controller.
He may issue an approach clearance to an aircraft without specifying a maintain altitude only when
an aircraft is established on a published route or segment of the approach procedure. However, as
this safety report speaks of pilot confusion when an altitude to maintain is not specified in an
approach clearance, we will, through our Accident Prevention Specialists and Counselors, undertake
a pilot education effort.
At future pilot meetings and seminars, we will discuss the appropriate FARs and the AIM,
Part 1, procedures relating to clearances and approach procedures, most specifically, AIM, 1-67
through AIM, 1-76.
3. Text of AB: Various locations (presently Denver, CO, and Atlanda, GA): Profile descent
experiment. Numerous reports have been received that criticize various aspects of the profile
descent program as described in AC 90-73 and applicable instrument charts. The most frequent
criticism relates to the profile descent charts. Both the original issue and the 2-24 revision for DEN
show not only the profile descent restrictions, but also the MEA's for each segment. Several reports
indicate that some pilots have descended through crossing restrictions because of confusion caused
by the depiction of the MEA's. The 2-24 NOAA ATL charts do not show the MEA's, only the
profile restrictions. Can this be done on the DEN charts also? Chart clutter is another complaint
received from a number of reporters.
The other major criticism is of excessive communications from ATC during profile descents at
DEN, in which additional altitude, airspeed, and vector changes are given while the crew is trying as
much as possible to maintain the profile. It is pointed out that precise adherence to these profiles
imposes a substantially increased workload on flight crew, especially in view of multiple airspeed
reductions above 10,000 ft, and that additional restrictions further increase this workload.
Text of Response: Profile Descent routings are not designated as federal airways and are
constructed with descent gradients and obstruction clearance taken into consideration. On the
June 16 charts all MEAs will be identified so as to eliminate any confusion.
The June publication of Profile Descent charts was developed using new charting criteria.
These criteria have reduced chart clutter, proliferation, and an extensive amount of pilot/controller
communications.
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We attribute the excessive amount of communications that now exist to the fact that this is a
new program. As experience and confidence in the procedures increase, a substantial reduction in
communications should occur. We have, however, reminded our regional offices to monitor this
particular aspect of Profile Descent procedures.
4. Text of AB: Jackson, MS, Allen C. Thompson Field: Missed approach procedures for
runway 15R LOG BC and VOR runway 15R approaches on NOAA charts show a curved dotted
arrow and contain instructions: "Climbing left turn to 2000 on R-129 JAN VORTAC within
15 NM." The instructions do not specify which direction to go on the R-129, however, and no
clearance limit is specified. Jeppeson plates, however, specify that direction of travel on the radial is
OUTBOUND from JAN and indicate this. It appears from ASRS reports that NOAA chart is open
to misinterpretation with respect to this procedure.
Text of Response: Flight Standards National Field Office has been directed by memorandum
dated March 23, 1977, to incorporate a clearance limit in the missed approach for all instrument
approach procedures where they are not presently included. Exceptions may be made only when
such a clearance limit would result in a very complicated missed approach procedure, in which case
the direction of flight along a radial or bearing would be identified as "outbound" or "inbound" as
appropriate.
The above mentioned procedures for Jackson, MS are presently being processed to amend the
missed approach instructions. Changes will be incorporated in other affected procedures as they
become due for routine amendments.
5. Text of AB: Portland, OR Approach Control and Flight Service Station: Report alleged
that pilots in VFR flight wishing to file an IFR flight plan cannot do so by virtue of a letter of
agreement between the Portland ATCT and Portland FSS. That letter allegedly stipulates that any
IFR flight plan filed in-flight in Portland's airspace must be filed through approach control. The
reporter notes that approach control has neither a separate frequency, personnel, nor pertinent
weather data on the proposed route of flight — items normally available with a FSS flight plan
filing. Additionally, Portland Approach Control has no way of including an alternate airport,
estimated time enroute or other information ATC might need in event of radio failure.
Text of Response: No Letter of Agreement exists between the Portland FSS and Portland
ATCT covering flight plan handling. Our investigation revealed that certain specialists felt there was
a "working arrangement" on how to handle air files. The two facility chiefs have resolved this issue
with their personnel — flight plans are accepted as published in the Airman's Information Manual
(AIM), Part 1, pages 1-52 through 1-56.
It is true that we do not provide a separate frequency or additional personnel for the taking of
flight plans at Portland Approach Control. Also, it is true that Service A weather is not available
from the approach control facility. We have no plans to include any of the above at our approach
control facilities.
Finally, terminal facilities and centers do not require a complete flight plan before issuing a
clearance. The AIM, Part 1, page 1-53; Subject, "Flight Plan - IFR," paragraph l.a., first sentence,
43
may not be clear to the public. In fact, "complete" flight plan information is seldom required or
desired from pilots who file flight plans by radio with towers or centers.
An "abbreviated IFR Flight Plan" is an authorization by ATC which requires the pilot to
submit only that information needed for the purpose of IFR flight. It includes only a small portion
of the usual IFR flight plan information.
The following definition of "Abbreviated IFR Flight Plan" is being submitted for inclusion in
the Pilot/Controller Glossary.
ABBREVIATED IFR FLIGHT PLAN - An authorization by ATC requiring pilots
to submit only that information needed for the purpose of ATC It includes only a
small portion of the usual IFR flight plan information. In certain instances, this may
be only aircraft identification, location, and pilot request. Other information may be
requested if needed by ATC for separation/control purposes. It is frequently used by
aircraft which are airborne, desire an instrument approach, or by aircraft on the
ground which desire a climb to VFR on top (See VFR ON TOP) (Refer to AIM,
Part 1).
We intend to review the present AIM "Flight Plan" text to determine its currency, to reduce
the size of text where possible and clarify the matter of "Abbreviated IFR Flight plan."
6. Text of AB: Victor 103-218, Northwest of Akron (OH) VORTAC: A potential for
misunderstanding ATC instructions exists relating to SHEFF and CHAFE intersections. The names
of the two intersections sound very similar, both are on V-103,218, both are referenced from the
Cleveland VORTAC, and both serve a heavy traffic area. A recent pilot report noted this difficulty
in distinguishing between Sheff and Chafe intersections during radio communications with ATC.
Text of Response: The CHAFE intersection will be changed to CHUGG intersection effective
June 16,1977.
AIRPORTS: FACILITIES AND MAINTENANCE
FA A personnel and the management staffs of the respective airports have been very responsive
to both the short-term and Jong-range considerations associated with issues raised by ASRS Alert
Bulletins. Their attitude of cooperation is exhibited in the following examples of airport-related
problems and their solutions. Bulletins 7, 8, and 9 deal with aircraft ground operations. Both
ground and approach to landing operations are effected by the unmarked fence discussed in
Bulletin 10. Finally, the importance of something as basic as clean windows is noted in Bulletin 11.
1. Text of AB: Various locations: Standard Operating Procedures after landing: Numerous
reports from pilots and controllers on conflicts between taxiing aircraft indicate serious misunder-
standings among pilots as to how far beyond runway margins a pilot may taxi prior to receiving a
taxi clearance from Ground Control. Reports indicate also that there is considerable variability
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among airlines and among airports with regard to controller expectations as to flight crew
procedures for taxiing. The resultant conflicts have in some cases had quite serious accident
potential. Several reports suggest that both regulations and recommended operating procedures be
standardized and clarified for all concerned. Although this has been a particularly serious problem
at Atlanta-Hartsfield, many reports have been received from other locations as well.
Text of Response: Although the Airman's Information Manual (AIM), Part 1, pages 44 and 45,
discusses after landing taxi requirements, we believe it is possible and desirable to improve upon
the existing language. Accordingly, a complete review and upgrade of this section of the AIM
is underway. Controller handbooks will be amended as necessary . . . (Response goes on to discuss
corrective measures at Atlanta.)
8. Text of AB: Anchorage International Airport, AK: Report alleges that the overflow parking
area for jet transport aircraft, adjacent to the north taxi way, presents a serious problem for smaller
aircraft in the general aviation parking area. When heavy aircraft start up and begin taxiing, jet blast
across the general aviation ramp threatens aircraft parked on that ramp.
Text of Response: The subject alert bulletin alleges that overflow jet transport aircraft are
being parked adjacent to the north taxiway which creates a jet blast problem for general aviation
aircraft using the north taxiway or general aviation parking area.
Discussion with the airport management discloses that the parking spots on the extreme north
edge of the heavy aircraft parking ramp are no longer being utilized. Not only was the jet blast a
problem, but the aircraft wings overhanging the service road and taxiway present traffic conflicts.
This summer the west parking apron will be reconstructed. During this period the north apron
will be utilized by the contractor as a staging area for equipment and materials.
9. Text of AB: West Palm Beach (FL) Airport - taxiway "F" north of runway 27R onto
taxiway "C" eastbound: Several pilot reports point out the difficulty experienced by large,
particularly "stretched," aircraft attempting the tight turn onto taxiway "C" from taxiway "F"
without leaving the,narrow paved surface and possibly getting stuck in the sand. Pilots state that
even with extreme care the turn from "F* to "C" is difficult; the turn is particularly difficult during
darkness due to the fact that the taxiway lights at this point are set back about 12 ft from the paved
surface, thereby making it very hard to discern where the pavement ends and sand begins. All
reporters suggest widening the pavement in the turn area and providing better-'taxiway light
placement.
Text of Response: The airport's management is aware of this problem and proposes to widen
the fillet where taxiway **F* intersects taxiway "C," relocate taxiway lighting to proper distance
from taxiway edge, and repaint taxiway markings in the upcoming ADAP 04 project. In the interim
taxiway "F" is closed until further notice and a NOTAM'has been issued to this effect.
10. Text of AB: Oklahoma City, OK, Downtown Airpark: A recent pilot report indicates that
an unmarked, 4-ft high, barbed-wire fence is located within 2 ft of the run-up area for runway 16 at
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this airport. The same fence ako runs nearly perpendicular to the final approach path for
runway 16. The fence is not marked in any manner, and its presence is not noted in Part II of the
A.I.M. The reporter suggests that the persons responsible for this privately owned airport paint the
fence with reflective, light-colored paint and provide both the run-up and approach path sides of the
fence posts with reflective markers; in addition, it was suggested that Part II of the AIM provide
some precautionary note regarding the proximity of this fence to the run-up and runway areas.
Text of Response: Oklahoma City Airports District Office advises that the AIM is being
updated to reflect precautionary information. ADO has written the owner of this private airport
outlining the problems and suggesting corrective marking.
11. Text of AB: Louisville, KY, Standiford Field: The cab windows in the SDF Control
Tower are reported to be critically in need of cleaning. Citing the combination of dirt, water spots,
and sun glare one report notes that at certain "low sun" hours final approach and pattern traffic is
extremely difficult to control by means of visual contact. It is alleged that the automatic
window-washers have never performed properly.
Text of Response: The problems were caused by extremely cold weather and a janitorial
contract problem. Both have been resolved. The automatic window washer has required a lot of
maintenance, but the stated problem was inside, not outside; the washer is now operational.
AIRPORTS: LIGHTING AND APPROACH AIDS
Airport lighting and approach aids continue to be the subject of many ASRS reports. Since the
initiation of the ASRS program, reports dealing with this subject have been a consistent, and
productive, source of information on possible problems in the aviation system. Bulletin 12 deals
with the effects of illusion on approaches into the St. Thomas. V.I. airport. Approaches to Denver's
runways 35 under instrument meteorological conditions are discussed in Bulletin 13. The continu-
ing importance of NDB's is highlighted in Bulletins 14 and 15. Variable localizer signals, and the
FAA's ongoing efforts to improve the situation, are described in Bulletin 16. Bulletin 17 involves
the radiation of simultaneous ILS signals for approaches onto intersecting runways. A TIS announce-
ments regarding parallel runway operations are the subject of Bulletin 18. The last example in this
category addresses a local problem with approach light intensities (19).
12. Text of AB: St. Thomas, V.I., Charlotte Amalie Airport runway 9: Numerous reports have
been received regarding the runway marking at STT. The runway is 4658 X 200 ft. Its extra width
and shortness combine to give pilots the illusion that it is even shorter. The illusion is strengthened
by the hill beyond the runway. VASI is less effective because it is further lateral in the pilot's visual
field, and the distance markers, well off to the side of the runway, are too small to be helpful. The
only useful marking is the TDZ marker, and once past it, pilots have little to help them in
estimating distance to go.
Pilots plead for immediate modification of runway markings by painting a 25-ft wide white
stripe on each edge of runway to provide a more standard apparent width, provision of large
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distance-to-go markers on or immediately adjacent to both sides of runway, and if possible
improvement in positioning of VASI.
Text of Response: The Southern Region advises that the following actions have been taken.
A. In order to reduce the illusionary effect of a short runway created by the 200-ft width of
the present runway, white edge markings have recently been painted 150 ft apart down the length
of the runway.
B. Installation of a new, two-bar VASI has been completed.
C. New runway distance markers have been installed and are much more visible than the
previous ones.
13. Text of AB: Denver, CO, Stapleton International Airport: Several reports have described
difficulties with approaches to runways 35 under instrument meteorological conditions. The diffi-
culties involve mistiming ILS and shooting approaches to wrong runway.
It appears that two factors are involved. One is the relative positions of the two runways;
runway 35L comes into view first under limited visibility conditions. Little can be done about this
except to increase pilot awareness.
The other factor is that Englewood Intersection and Gandi OM are used for ILS approaches to
both runways. It has been suggested that if Englewood and Gandi were renamed for the 35R ILS
approach, pilots would hear, read, and be required to report at a uniquely named fix; they would
therefore be less likely to use the wrong approach plate, which would contain unique names for the
fixes. Additionally, ATC would be able to monitor which runway ILS the pilot was actually using,
as a check on pilots.
Text of Response: We have coordinated the subject Alert Bulletin with personnel in the Rocky
Mountain Region and have been unable to confirm that this report represents a major problem.
ATC personnel at Denver advise that pilots seem to have a preference for using Runway 35 L when
cleared for approaches to Runway 35R but they are not aware of a problem in mistuning the ILS. If
this is a pilot problem, we do not concur with the suggestion for using different names for the
common outer marker serving both ILS systems.
Air Traffic Service has recently issued a letter to user organizations amplifying the need for
precise adherence to ATC clearances and the importance of selecting the proper frequency when
tuning in navigation facilities. They have also stressed these issues internally by GENOT. In
addition, the Denver Tower has advised that they will include the ILS frequency whenever an
approach clearance is issued for Runway 35L or Runway 35R.
The problem identified in the Alert Bulletin appears to be an isolated one. Actions taken by
ATC, as outlined above, are responsive to this report and should preclude the possibility of selecting
the wrong ILS frequency at Stapleton Airport.
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14. Text of AB: Lebanon, NH, Lebanon Regional Airport: Navigation facilities are discussed
in recent ASRS reports. Power output of White River NDB (IVV 379) is cited as being too low for
consistent reception within 10 n. mi. of facility, despite normal beacon monitor readings. This is a
more serious problem at present time because LEB VOR is out of service. Terrain compounds
problems due to unreliable reception of IVV.
Text of Response: An on-site inspection of the ground system at the Lebanon NDB on
March 30, 1977, revealed that the power company ground, transmitter rack ground, and antenna
ground radial system were at different potentials. This condition was corrected immediately and we
anticipate that system performance will improve.
15. Text of AB: Iliamna, AK, and Big Mountain, AK, Nondirectiona] Beacons: Several
reports have been received from professional pilots describing present problems in using IL1 NDB,
and the future problems which will result when BMX is shut down, (airspace proposal
76-AL-10-INR). All reports describe difficulty in getting ADF bearings on IL1 beyond 10—15 miles.
They note that ILI and BMX are the only radio navigation facilities for their respective airports and
the only facilities available for low-altitude VFR navigation assistance. ILI FSS has no VHP DF
equipment, thus no back-up is available for marginal weather. Several pilots request that ILI NDB
be relocated off one end of runway 17-35 for more effective approaches (present cat. A minima are
400-1, but NDB is 2.2 miles from airport). All request a substantial increase in I Li's radiated power,
especially since Big Mountain airport will be unusable in marginal weather if BMX is
decommissioned.
Text of Response: We are aware of the problems with the Iliamna NDB. The Alaskan Region
plans to replace the existing equipment by October 1977. Installation of the new transmitter and
associated antenna should greatly improve the operational service volume of the Iliamna NDB.
Facility relocation is being considered, but with land acquisition uncertainties, the exact location
cannot be determined at this time. We will select the best possible location available.
16. Text of AB: Longview, TX; Gregg County Airport: Localizer signals on the ILS approach
(109.5 MHz) to runway 13 are reported by pilots to be extremely variable. In one instance the pilot
experienced large variations on either side of the center line from 2 to 3 miles outside the OM down
to DH; when he discussed this lack of reliability of the signals with ATC personnel, they confirmed
that other pilots had complained of the same problem.
Text of Response: In late February 1977, a screen was constructed immediately behind the
localizer array. As a result of this screen the localizer course was significantly improved from the
outer limit of coverage to the middle marker. After this construction, the facility was returned to
service on March 4, 1977.
17. Text of AB: New York, NY, JF Kennedy Airport: A recent report involves aircraft cleared
for approach to runway 31R, then switched to runway 31L. ILS frequency 110.9 tuned; identifier
for ILS runway 22L received. Pilot was told both ILS transmitters were radiating simultaneously.
He suggests a lockout device to protect against this possibility in future.
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Text of Response: At Kennedy Airport there are seven ILS systems for which three frequen-
cies have been assigned on an interchangeable basis. These frequencies are assigned as follows:
109.5MHz to 4R-22R-ILS
110.9MHz to 4L-31L-22L ILS
111.5MHzto31R-13LILS
Three ILS systems are on the air at all times except for intentional shutdowns or system
failures.
Runways 4R/L and 22L/R are equipped with a lockout device whereby only one ILS can be
on the air for the direction of landing, that is, 4R/L or 22L/R.
In the case cited it appears that the ILS for runway 22L was indeed on the air and the
information given the pilot that the runway 31L ILS was radiating was incorrect.
To preclude recurrence of this incident, this facility has coordinated with the Chief, Kennedy
Tower to assure that when ILS approaches are being conducted to the Kennedy runway 31R, the
runway 31L ILS shall be on the air. Since the runway 22L/31L ILS's have lockout devices that
react to each other, a repetition of this incident should not occur.
18. Text of AB: Reports describe ATIS identification of a specific landing runway at parallel
runway installations, followed by controller clearance to the other parallel runway, after which
pilots land on runway named in ATIS. Controllers suggest an alerting phraseology such as "Landing
runways 17L and 17R, dual runway operations in use" as a corrective measure.
Text of Response: The procedures for ATIS are contained in Handbook 7210.3C-1350 and
permit the phraseology as suggested by the controllers in the safety report. The handbook clearly
specifies "runway/s" and Example #2 also identifies approaches in use to two runways. We know
that most locations do specify multiple runways when more than one is used. However, we are
publicizing the matter in our Supervisors Digest as a reminder.
19. Text of AB: Herndon Airport, Orlando, Florida: With the nightly shutdown of Herndon's
control tower at 2300 (local time), the approach lights to runway 7 are set to high intensity; the
Orlando FSS is unable to control the intensity of the lights. Recent pilot reports complain about
the brightness of these lights, particularly following an IFR flight and breaking out under a low
overcast. A report suggests light systems that are controllable either by Orlando FSS or from the
aircraft if lights are left on high setting because of lights on highway south of airport.
Text of Response: The Airway facilities Division, FAA Southern Region, has coordinated with
the Air Traffic Division to ensure the correct operation of approach lights to runway 7 at Herndon
Airport. When the control tower is unattended, the approach lights will be set to medium intensity
step number 3. A memorandum establishing this procedure has been brought to the attention of
each air traffic controller at Herndon Airport. Because of the expense of installing additional
controls at the Orlando flight service station, no further action will be taken unless the approach
light intensity continues to be a problem during unattended tower operation.
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AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL FACILITIES AND PROCEDURES
Bulletins 20 and 21 address issues arising with the use of advanced radar beacon equipment.
Coordination and communications problems are the subjects of Bulletins 22 and 23. Bulletin 24
relates to the cost versus benefit dilemma as it relates to an ATC function.
20. Text of AB: Omaha Radar System, Minneapolis ARTCC: Extensively documented reports
of problems associated with this particular radar system have been received. Numerous examples
exist of weak, lost, and split beacons and of false targets, target swapping, "ring around," and
azimuth shifting. Several reports allege that the problems have existed for 5 years and have not been
diminished or corrected despite repeated UCR's, USR's, and formal requests for assistance. Accord-
ing to recent reports the problems associated with the radar system are becoming more acute due to
the rerouting of aircraft from J60 to J144 to accommodate Denver's new high profile descent
program. The reconfiguration of these traffic routes because of the Denver program causes more
aircraft to transit the area served by the radar system in question. Controllers allege that radar
separation cannot be provided within a 25 mile radius of the "main bang" at Omaha. This condition
creates the necessity for setting up aircraft separation prior to their entry into the problem area, and
then hoping that the separation will continue to exist until the traffic is once again in a workable
radar area.
Text of Response: The problems outlined in the subject NASA Aviation Safety Report have
been under investigation for several months. Several changes have been made; several changes are
forecast.
Changes in the Minneapolis Center traffic flow, to accommodate Denver Center's sector
realignment for profile descent, have caused a substantial increase in traffic operating in the
proximity of the Omaha radar system antenna site.
Recently the following actions were taken to alleviate unsatisfactory beacon target returns,
false targets, ring around, and azimuth shifting:
a. The STC power setting was reduced.
b. The beacon omni power was raised to 1,000 \V.
c. The number of "hits" to declare a target was raised from six to seven.
Extensive testing within the last 2 months indicates that the problem has been reduced to the
point that the Omaha radar system is the best system in Minneapolis Center in terms of false beacon
returns. A sample test of the various Minneapolis radar systems rendered 561 false returns out of a
total 73,330 beacon targets (0.76%) for the Omaha system. This was the lowest percentage of any
system in the center. Additionally, input from the facility indicates the aforementioned "hardware
fixes" have substantially reduced the "ring around."
At present, Minneapolis Center is testing a software modification. This modification would
further reduce or eliminate the troubles encountered with the Omaha radar system.
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In no case do we operate in a mode where we hope separation will exist. It is the controller's
responsibility to ensure separation and if he cannot provide radar separation, he will usenonradar
separation. We provide air traffic service in many areas where there is no radar coverage and safety is
not jeopardized.
Another long-range radar site is being considered to augment Minneapolis' Omaha system.
Since Lease Service funds to provide data lines are not available at this time, we would have to
submit this item through the budget process.
21. Text of AB: Cleveland, OH, Cleveland Hopkins TRACON: Controller reports indicate that
despite numerous local and regional actions the attempts to improve the performance of primary
and secondary radar and associated equipment commissioned with new TRACON in July 1976,
false beacons, limited data blocks, and data switching persist unabated. Average rates of up to 80
such problems per hour are described. Reports suggest that misleading data occurring this fre-
quently have led controllers to serious distrust of even good data with considerably increased
potential for errors in handling traffic at this busy terminal. UCR's 316,126, 316,121, and 315,683
refer. It is stated that no lasting improvement has occurred with any of the actions taken.
Text of Response: The Great Lakes Region has taken several actions which improved the radar
beacon equipment operation at the Cleveland Hopkins TRACON. The latest action was accom-
plished on April 5, 1977. This action decreased the number of false beacon replies from approxi-
mately 0.85% to 0.25%. The Air Traffic Tower Chief was advised on April 14 regarding this
improvement. A follow-up check (April 25) on the current operation indicated that system
performance is satisfactory. The region will continue to monitor the system performance and take
necessary action should the performance be found unsatisfactory.
22. Text of AB: New York, NY: NYCIFRR: Three reports have been received in the past
month of aircraft handoffs to Sates arrival sector, none with advance notice, none on a standard
routing. One aircraft was 150-ACY V44 LEGGS-DRIFT-DPK 209 SELFF-BDR, 7000. A second
was GSB V44 SATES-HPN, 7000. A third was CRE/V44 SATES-HPN, 13,000. No FDEP informa-
tion was received by NYCIFRR, no ARTS data in CIFRR computer. In one case, the aircraft
arrived at Leggs with traffic holding at SATES at 7000. Reports suggest that such traffic, cleared on
non-standard routes during peak traffic hours and arriving without advance notice, constitutes a
hazard.
Text of Response: The route V44 V229 through the CIFRR airspace was designed primarily to
service single-engine aircraft enroute New England and Washington terminals at altitudes of
6000 and 7000 ft.
The CIFRR may suspend this operation with 15 minutes advance notice to the New York
Center. Additionally, with prior coordination multi-engine aircraft may, at the discretion of the
CIFRR Supervisor, utilize this route at higher altitudes. Advance notice should be received via
FDEP, and ARTS data should be in the CIFRR computer prior to the flight being transferred to the
CIFRR. If this was not accomplished, it would appear that the flights were not entered into FDEP
properly by the New York Center.
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In any case, under mandatory radar handoff procedures, the Center must retain aircraft within
their delegated airspace until a radar handoff is accomplished.
Supervisors have been briefed to be alert for malfunctions in FDEP strip printing, and to advise
the data system staff to follow-up any identified problem with New York Center.
23. Text of AB: Puerto Rico, San Juan ARTCC: Pilot reports describe problems in communi-
cating with ZSU on both 134.3 and 121.5 in vicinity of Mayaguez, due apparently to ZSLTs
inability to use El Yunque site and remote transceiver at Las Mesas simultaneously. They are
concerned that traffic departing or experiencing an emergency in the area of Mayaguez may not be
able to communicate effectively with ATC. Mayaguez Tower does not have 121.5; problem is most
severe when tower is not in operation.
Text of Response: The lack of emergency frequencies (121.5 HMz/243.0 HMz) in the
Mayaguez area was recognized as a potential problem area, and an FY-77 F&E project was
generated to provide the service. Action will be taken to provide the emergency frequencies as soon
as the equipment is available and DCS link channels can be obtained.
24. Text of AB: New York, NY, NYC1FRR: JFK sector departure controllers are responsible
for handling light aircraft transiting JFK area NE and SW bound, including aircraft enroute to Long
Island. Departure controllers state they frequently need destination airport weather and JFK
altimeter settings but must leave position to obtain it. Digital altimeter readouts are available at all
arrival positions but not at departure position.
Text of Response: The problem as stated can be answered best in two parts, because the
issuance of destination airport weather and the issuance of JFK altimeter are really two different
issues.
When the digital altimeter displays were installed at the Common IFR Room, facility
management decided, after a careful study of cost versus benefit, that altimeter displays were not to
be installed at the departure sectors. Part of the reasoning used was the fact that the departure
controller is very rarely required to issue an altimeter setting. Also, when this does become
necessary, the handoff or data controller can obtain the appropriate altimeter setting via interphone
from one of the arrival sectors or towers. The best estimate available for the number of times this
would occur at the JFK departure sector is less than six per shift on the busiest days. The only
altimeter settings that are regularly displayed, in the facility are for Kennedy, La Guardia, and
Newark Airports, so if the controller needs a setting for one of the more distant satellite airports,
such as Islip, it is necessary to obtain it by interphone from the tower.
The weather information that is displayed in the Common IFR Room is from JFK,
La Guardia, Morristown, Teterboro, and Newark Airports only. This is done via electrowriters to
the Kennedy, La Guardia, and Newark arrival sectors. Anytime any sector controls an aircraft
destined for any other satellite airport, it is necessary for the sector to call the tower and obtain the
most current weather at that airport. In the case of the aircraft that transit the JFK departure sector
destined for airports on Long Island, usually the aircraft are handed off from the La Guardia arrival
52
sector. The La Guardia arrival sector does not have interphone capability to the appropriate airports
so must rely on JFK sectors to issue the destination weather.
Common IFR Room management is committed to preparing a facility directive that will
thoroughly explain and set policy for the handling of these operations, and define responsibility for
issuance of altimeter settings and weather.
HAZARDS TO FLIGHT
Bulletin 25 covers an issue of concern to both controllers and pilots — simultaneous landings
on intersecting runways. A topic of particular interest to air carrier pilots is discussed in Bulletin 2(5;
departure procedures expressed in terms of a minimum rate of climb in feet per nautical mile was
treated rather extensively by the reporter. While the response to Bulletin 26 included in this report
represents only the answer from the FAA. it should be noted that responses to the Alert Bulletin
were also received from other aviation industry organizations that had been provided with copies of
the Bulletin as a matter of courtesy. Bulletins 27 and 28 represent an awareness of, and the response
to, purely regional and local problems.
25. Text of AB: Daytona Beach, FL, Daytona Beach Regional Airport Air Traffic Control
Tower: An air carrier report describes a recent landing at DAB on runway-06L in which, on short
final, he was asked to hold short of 34 due to student pilot training flights utilizing that runway. He
points out that this eliminates 1600ft of a 7500ft runway, that it poses a potentially serious
hazard if carrier aircraft has to go around. A runway parallel to the jet runway is available.
Text of Response: The procedure which allows simultaneous landings on intersecting runways
is a safe procedure when applied properly. We intend to continue the use of the procedure where
operational benefits are realized to the user or the system. Supervisors will monitor the application
of these procedures to ensure they are applied properly. The pilot always retains the option to
refuse a landing if he believes the procedure is not acceptable.
26. Text of AB: A potentially hazardous situation has been brought to the attention of the
ASRS. Although confirmed by various other reports, the nature of the situation is best stated and
analyzed in the following narrative summary, quoted with the permission of the pilot-reporter:
"The problem occurs when a minimum rate of climb in feet per nautical mile is specified on a
departure procedure. Feet per nautical mile climb gradients are not specified in air carrier aircraft
operating manuals, nor is any other type of rate-of-climb information. Only FAR climb limitation
information is specified. This information frequently does not provide adequate coverage up to the
elevations commonly used in SID departures and only extends out to about 6.0 n. mi. Also, such
information is impossible to use when attempting to determine whether an airplane can make a
specified climb gradient. The purpose of the TOGW Limited by Obstacle Clearance table is to
determine a maximum takeoff gross weight for a given runway length with an obstruction fairly
close-in to the runway. Computer printout performance data appearing in route manuals which
pilots use instead of the TOGW charts is derived from these same operating manual charts. The data
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in most cases covers only straight out departures and there is no attempt to associate SID or IFR
departure procedure climb gradients with maximum takeoff gross weights. It is now up to, the
flightcrew's experience and "gut feeling" as to what the rate of climb will be. In most cases climb
gradients specified on SID and IFR departure procedures pose no problem during normal opera-
tions. But, in some cases the climb gradients cannot be complied with during high gross weight/high
density altitude operations. For example, the Taipei, Formosa chart which specifies a 420 foot per
nautical mile climb gradient. On a hot day it is doubtful that a grossed out 747 could maintain the
necessary rate of climb to accomplish this SID with all engines operating. Consider what the
situation would be if an ingine failure occured after takeoff."
The reporter provides the following suggestions as possible methods to correct the situation:
"Require the airplane manufacturing companies to provide climb gradient information in feet
per nautical mile, on a simple to use chart which can be related directly to the ft/n. mi. climb
gradient information on the SID or IFR departure procedure. The climb chart should contain
necessary information such as airport elevation, temperature, and airplane gross weight.
"Two such charts should be provided, one for all engines operating, and one for an engine out.
If the airplane cannot accomplish a terrain limited departure procedure with an engine out, the crew
should be provided with an alternate departure procedure in the event an engine fails. Or, perhaps
the departure procedure should not be attempted on four engines, depending on whether the climb
restrictions are based on terrain, ATC, or noise abatement.
"The aircraft operating manual 4 engine profile should extend to at least 5000 ft, maybe
higher (based on a world analysis of SIDs and IFR departure procedures). The profile should be
based on the ATA noise abatement profile unless another universally approved profile can be found
(V2 + 10 to 3000 ft AFE, then an acceleration through the flap retraction schedule at approxi-
mately 500 fpm, then acceleration to the 250 knot climb speed or climb schedule speed). The
second chart should be based on the engine out profile. The profile in the engine out case will be a
little harder to derive for universal approval and probably would be tailored to an operators SOP.
However, the result should be the same. At the end of the runway, the pilot should be able to
quickly determine if a new SID is acceptable.
"The SID or IFR departure procedure should contain a box which specifies the minimum
vertical speed value in feet per minute which is required to make good the climb gradient. It should
be referred to during the departure to assure conformance to the minimum climb gradient as the
airplane accelerates through the flap retraction schedule."
Text of Response: These comments are in responses to the subject NASA Alert Bulletin
concerning the availability of obstacle clearance data in operating manuals. Obstacle clearance
information for FAR Part 25 aircraft is presented in FAA-approved Airplane Flight Manuals. These
data are presented as obstacle height versus downrange distance for each gross climb gradient
available, and fulfill the requirements of FAR 25.1587.
The pilot-reporter states that obstacle clearance information is not available from air carrier
operating manuals. However, manufacturers do make these data available and they may be included
in operating manuals if the air carrier so chooses.
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Further development of this data requirement must be initiated by the air carrier.
27. Text of AB: Western Washington and Oregon: A controller-pilot reports that research
reported about 2 years ago indicated that the worst icing conditions over west slope of the Cascades
are in a sloping band about 1000—2000 ft thick, base 1500 ft or so above the general slope of the
terrain. He also notes that normal ATC procedures for descending westbound traffic from relatively
high MEA's over the Cascades to the successive MVA's for landing at Seattle will take low altitude
aircraft through the worst of the icing band in typical winter storms. He asks whether wider
dissemination of such information, and possibly revised vector descent patterns might not enhance
pilot and controller awareness of the hazard and assist especially general aviation traffic in avoiding
the areas of greatest risk.
Text of Response: We are familiar with the band of icing conditions on the west slope of the
Cascades. The Flight Standards Accident Prevention Specialists hold many meetings each year to
discuss hazards to flight such as this one. Last year there were 65 such meetings with over
4000 pilots in attendance. The problem of icing in this area cannot be stressed enough. The
Accident Prevention Specialist is going to prepare a separate Letter to Airmen on this subject
towards the end of summer. It will be disseminated to pilots.
The ice band is not static, but rather changes in size and location depending on the
temperature. It would not be practical to revise procedures to completely remain clear of this area.
Our Towers, Flight Service Stations, and the Air Route Traffic Control Center are aware of icing
problems in the Northwest Region. They normally receive pilot reports on icing conditions and are
able to pass this information on to other pilots.
28. Text of AB: Albany, NY runway 10 Final Approach Course: Report cites lack of V AS I
plus high, unlighted terrain, including tall trees, creates a hazardous situation during night opera-
tions to runway 10 at Albany. Problem is further compounded by the fact that runway 10 is of
minimum length for jet aircraft operations.
Text of Response: The reopening of runway 1-19 this fall reduced the use of runway 10
currently to approximately 1% of total airport movements.
VASI on runway 10 is regarded as a very low priority item at Albany. Trees have been cut in
the approach area for runway 10. There is an obstruction light on a pole on the ridge to the west of
the threshold. This is the controlling obstruction. An airport inspection was conducted about
February 25. No hazardous or unusual conditions noted.
MILITARY-CIVIL COORDINATION
Two general categories of issues typify the subject of military-civil coordination. First, the
exchange of information regarding the existence of modified or new military procedures and
current flight operations to the appropriate civilian facilities, is addressed in Bulletins 29 and 30.
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Tiie second, potential conflict situations during actual flight operations, is covered in Bulletins 31
and 32.
29. Text of AB: Various locations: Lack of timely notification to FAA Flight Service Station
(FSS) and ATC facilities concerning planned military low altitude training route (TR) operations is
reported to be creating potential conflict situations. Citing specific examples of notification being
received by FSS personnel after the operations had already taken place or while the routes were
being flown, a recent report from an FSS specialist pointed out several hazards resulting from
failures to comply with the notification provisions of DOD Flight Information Publication AP/1B.
Of particular concern was the possibility of civilian pilots being lured into complacency after
voluntarily requesting information on TR operations and being informed that the applicable TR's
were not active, when in fact the FSS had not received timely notification of TR operations which
might already be in progress or about to begin. The FSS report also questioned that level of safety
resulting from the provisions of DOD Publication AP/1B, section II, paragraph ^-Communications,
subparagraph 2, which states: "If contact with FSS cannot be established, route may be flown as
filed."
Text of Response: Headquarters Tactical Air Command (TAC) is the primary USAF major
command that uses low altitude training routes at speeds above 250 knots. The DOD makes every
effort to provide a safe environment and obtain the required training to be proficient in low level
navigation. All possible USAF flights file IFR flight plans to and from the training route entry and
exit points, respectively. Normally the composite (IFR/VFR/IFR) flight plans are put into the ATC
system for IFR clearance and dissemination to the appropriate FSS. When the ARTCC automated
system cannot handle the IFR/VFR/IFR flight plan, manual dissemination is required which is time
consuming and frequently precludes notification of the FSS of impending use of a training route.
When the USAF is made aware of these circumstances, procedures are established to call the
appropriate FSS directly. The USAF has no control over the FSS use of the flight plan information
and is not aware if departure times and/or entry and exit times are passed on to the FSS by
ARTCC. That information should be available from the FAA. Aircrews are instructed to initiate a
radio call to the FSS after completion of the IFR leg to the entry point. However, often release
from the ARTCC is at low altitude and not within the communication coverage of the FSS. That is
the reason flights are authorized to continue onto the published TR without radio contact. Based
on IFR flight plans, ATC clearance and actual departure times, however, TR usage information is
available in the air traffic system.
30. Text of AB: Rickenbacker AFB, OH: Recent ASRS report suggests that a breakdown in
coordination has occurred between the appropriate FAA air traffic control facilities and the Air
Force regarding additions, deletions, or modifications to military standard instrument departures
for this facility. Although the lack of coordination regarding Rickenbacker SIDs has been corrected
as it relates to the specific recent incident, the issue of a lack of established procedures to ensure
advance communication of future SID changes may represent a problem.
Text of Response: Contacted a representative at USAF Headquarters and learned that
Rickenbacker AFB had published a military SID and did not coordinate the effective date with the
FAA approach control at Columbus. This information was confirmed with a staff specialist in the
Great Lakes Region.
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The representative of USAF Headquarters and the Great Lakes Region believe that the existing
USAF procedures, as updated, are sufficient to preclude a similar problem in the future. Addition-
ally, the revised SID Order, which is now being finalized, will clarify FAA responsibilities in the
handling/coordination of military SIDs.
31. Text of AB: Omaha, Nebraska: Several reports from pilots and controllers reveal the
existence of an apparent critical situation in the vicinity of Millard Airport, as well as those sectors
serving traffic operating west in and out of Eppley Airfield. High-speed, low-level, military aircraft
operating off runway 12/30 from Offutt AFB are reported to have created conflict situations with
various types of civilian operations, specifically training aircraft out of Millard and air carrier traffic
'approaching Eppley from the southwest. Reporters contend that even though the AFB authorities
had agreed to keep training operations high in order to reduce potential conflicts and conserve fuel
costs, T-38 aircraft have been observed and recorded operating at 3000 ft with airspeeds up to
350 knots.
Text of Response: In an effort to minimize T-38s' initial IFR departure flight at 3000 ft MSL,
the Offutt RAPCON has recently initiated a special coordination procedure which facilitates
cancellation of the 3000-ft tunnel altitude in a timely manner; just before takeoff roll. This enables
the aircraft on a coordinated basis to climb immediately to higher altitudes, above local VFR
aircraft operating in proximity to Offutt's airport traffic area.
We have concluded from our investigation that, (1) T-38 aircraft are being controlled in a safe
and positive manner, (2) T-38 aircraft are being operated within their speed limitations, as waivered.
32. Text of AB: 25 miles west of Prescott (AZ) VORTAC in the vicinity of Victor 12: Several
controller reports document repeated excursions by military aircraft outside the north boundaries
of the Gladden 1A MOA; these operations generally involved penetration of the V-12 airspace. The
reported boundary violations occurred at various altitudes and in several instances resulted in
potential collision conditions between the military aircraft and civilian aircraft traveling on V-l 2.
Text of Response: The Southwest Region is aware of this problem and has already called it to
the attention of military authorities at Luke AFB. The military has assured the region that positive
action is being taken to curtail excursion from the military operation areas.
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Report
no. Topic Page
JUDGMENT FACTORS
25 Acrobatics over populated area 74
26 Poor lookout during practice IFR flight 74
27 Late extension of gear during approach 75
28 Reliance on automatic ATC devices 75
29 Conflict: thunderstorms in terminal area 75
30 Conflict in holding pattern 76
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COMMUNICATIONS AND MISUNDERSTANDINGS
Misunderstandings based on communication problems continue to be associated with occur-
rences reported to the Aviation Safety Reporting System. Three examples, ranging from a simple
problem to a rather complex one, are cited in the following reports.
1. Submitted by air traffic controller:
On this date I was assigned to the local position combined with ground control position and
monitoring an air traffic control trainee specialist. The trainee had been recently certified on the
ground control position. About 11:25 A.M., a single-engine aircraft called for taxi instructions from
the National Guard ramp. The trainee issued taxi instructions to nvy 15. In the meantime, a flight
of four fighter aircraft was approaching the area for an overhead 360 approach to rwy 21. The
priority traffic problem at that time was sequencing another light aircraft entering a left downwind
for rwy 15. That problem being solved, the fighter flight was cleared to land. As the lead aircraft in
the flight was touching down, he broadcast to "stay to the right side, aircraft on the rwy."
"Number 3 go-around." Simultaneously, I made a transmission "for 3 and 4 go-around," but I
couldn't see the aircraft number 1 in the flight mentioned. Subsequently I did see the light aircraft
taxiing at approximately midfield on the southeast side of rwy 21 and 3. The third and fourth
fighters in the flight went around. Instructions were then issued to the light aircraft to taxi straight
ahead turn southeast on rwy 15. after some confusion as to who the aircraft actually was. Numbers
three and four in the fighter flight then landed safely on rwy 21. Numbers 1 and 2 landed safely but
rolled out passing the light aircraft on the rwy.
Factors that led to the incident: (1) ground and local control positions were being worked
combined; (2) a trainee was being monitored on the combined positions; (3) taxi instructions issued
to the light aircraft were incomplete or at the very least confusing ("Taxi to rwy 15, hold short of
rwy 15"); (4) pilot of light aircraft not familiar with airport rwy or taxiway layout (the pilot taxiied
on a rwy without clearance); and (5) the aircraft color blended exceptionally well with terrain
(aircraft was white and green, bottom of aircraft green blended with grass, top of wing blended with
rwy).
2. Submitted by air traffic controller:
At 2129Z I relieved another controller on sector 15 interphone and radar. He briefed me on
the traffic situation. The briefing concerned an airliner landing Stapleton International, who had
just been given an amended clearance to FL230, and a departure climbing to FL220 deviating
around thunderstorms through the arrival gate. Thunderstorms were developing in the arrival and
departure gates.
After working with some traffic in the southeast sector, I looked back at aircraft B and
aircraft A and observed them to be head-on. So I called traffic to aircraft B as "Aircraft B traffic
twelve o'clock 10 miles descending to FL230." At this time I observed aircraft A's Mode C readout
indicated the aircraft was out of FL210 and the interim altitude was FL230 as was indicated on the
strip and as I was briefed. I requested aircraft A's altitude which was reported by the pilot as leaving
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FL20.7. I then requested Aircraft B's altitude which was reported as leaving FL210. I then told
aircraft A to expedite through FL200. I requested aircraft B's altitude again which he reported as
leaving FL21.5. I believe that I then noticed aircraft A was more than 1000 ft below aircraft B and
had been for 2 or 3 miles when 1 called traffic as twelve o'clock and 3 miles. The pilot's answer was
"in sight." I believe that 1 never had less than standard separation even though both aircraft were
head-on, one descending and one climbing.
After listening to the voice recording, I determined why aircraft A did not stop at FL230. The
controller I relieved did clear aircraft A to FL230 after a profile descent clearance was given earlier.
However, when the controller released his mike switch after giving the amended clearance, the pilot
of aircraft A was also on the frequency in the middle of a sentence and was overriding the
controller's transmission. The pilot never heard the amended clearance and so acknowledgment was
never received from the pilot by the controller.
3. Submitted by air traffic controller:
The corporate jet received a clearance to 15,000 from Binghamton, NY and then proceeded to
dial 17,000 in his window and began a climb to that altitude. On initial contact the jet advised he
was climbing 17,000. I issued a clearance to the aircraft to "Maintain 15,000." There was no reply.
I started a track on the aircraft and observed he was on the wrong transponder code. I then issued
the following clearance (from tape replay). "(Aircraft identification), Maintain 15,000, squawk 2703
and acknowledge please." The jet acknowledged only for the transponder code change. I was
convinced, however, that he had received the altitude assignment and proceeded to operate on that
basis. While issuing the clearance to the jet I was unusually busy with computer entries. His
configuration was such that "point-outs" were necessary to both a high and low altitude sector and
also a handoff to another high altitude sector. The point-outs had to be followed up with a verbal
confirmation that they were in fact received. An interim altitude, 15,000, was also placed into the
computer. (I was pushing a lot of buttons.)
Traffic for the jet was an air carrier proceeding over Hancock Victor 273 Syracuse. To facilitate
eventual descent clearance into Syracuse the airline was turned 20° left. This turn, fortunately,
provided the difference between a serious incident and what did occur. The airliner'was issued
traffic (required by merging targets procedure) as "one o'clock and 4 miles climbing to 15,000." The
corporate jet readout was 14,600: Airliner did not see traffic. The next altitude refresh was 15,000
and that was followed by an update of 15,300. The corporate jet was advised "Altitude assignment
is 15,000." The aircraft replied "We are climbing to 17,000." The two aircraft were laterally
separated at this point and the light jet was continued to FL250. The airliner, hearing this dialogue,
reported seeing the other aircraft high and off to the right.
It would seem that both co-pilot and controller in this situation misinterpreted information
and I would guess that a good part of this stems from the fact that both were preoccupied with
many other tasks.
It is my impression that since the advent of the current radar displays and automatic
procedures there has been a deterioration in a controller's "listening" skills because of an increased
reliance on the visual aspect of the job. More concretely, a change in Air Traffic Handbook,
paragraph 526, requires that traffic be issued only to scheduled air carriers under merging target
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procedures. If traffic had also been issued to the corporate jet, the aircraft may have been alerted to
the fact that something was amiss.
COORDINATION PROBLEMS
An interesting problem occurring at the junction of the airspace of three Air Route Traffic
Control Centers was recently reported by two controllers, both of whom described the problem in
similar terms. TJie report of one is reproduced here.
4. Submitted by air traffic controller:
I received a handoff from Kansas City Center on Aircraft B, FL390, westbound Jl 10 to Los
Angeles. A few seconds later I received another handoff from Kansas City Center on Aircraft A
northwest bound FL390 from southeast of Lamar direct Lamar landing Denver. At the time the
handoff was taken on Aircraft A, the conflict alert went off between the two aircraft which would
come together south of LAA if no action was taken. Working the interphone, I called Kansas City
Center and requested control to FL370 on one or the other aircraft. Kansas City released both
aircraft to my control to 370. With this information I informed my radar man that we had control
of either aircraft to FL370. Since aircraft A was landing at Denver the radar man cleared him to
FL370. He did not get a reply from the aircraft or see any altitude change and since time was
limited, he then cleared the other aircraft to 370. As aircraft B started to descend the conflict alert
once again went off but this time with aircraft C southeast bound at FL370. Prior to this time
Aircraft C had been in our airspace that had been handed off to Kansas City Center and was now in
their airspace, in the same sector which gave us aircraft A and B. Seeing this, my radar man climbed
aircraft B back to FL390 and turned him right to a heading of 360. He then turned aircraft A left to
a heading of 270 to that these two aircraft would stay apart. Once aircraft B was clear of aircraft C
he descended him again to FL370 so that he would go under aircraft A. I believe that aircraft A
and B should not have been handed off in the state that they were in. An altitude change on either
aircraft prior to the handoff would have worked out fine. Also, aircraft B should not have been
released to FL370 by Kansas City with aircraft C right in front of him going the other way.
The airspace where this took place is a very bad spot because three Centers come together
there (Denver, Albuquerque, Kansas City). Aircraft in this area become a problem day in and day
out. I believe it would help if Denver Center got airspace about 30 miles south of what they have
now into the Albuquerque area and about 40 miles east of what they have now into Kansas City
Center in the area around LAA, Having that airspace would reduce the problems that now occur.
We also have proper radar and radio coverage in this area.
While the second controller's report was virtually identical, he brought up another point which
is of some interest.
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5. Submitted by air traffic controller:
. .. After determining that aircraft B was definitely clear of aircraft C, I again instructed
aircraft B to maintain FL370. Another aircraft was eastbound on J102 at FL370 over LA A.
Reaching FL370 aircraft B was advised of the eastbound traffic. Thirty seconds later, aircraft B was
asked if he was making the requested left turn to 4LS. He replied that he was. He was again advised
of the traffic and he replied that he had the traffic in sight. I asked aircraft B his heading and he
replied 330. I then cleared the other aircraft to turn left 40°. The aircraft passed 4 miles apart,
1 mile less than required. Aircraft B had turned 30° in 1 minute. I knew that air carrier aircraft
turned slowly at high altitudes but I didn't know exactly how slowly. Perhaps if others had been
surprised by such turn rates, it would help if controllers would be provided with more specific
figures on high altitude air carrier turn rates.
Adequate briefings are an important part of coordination between controllers. The following
occurrence demonstrates the problems that can arise.
6. Submitted by air traffic controller:
On the above mentioned date, I was working flight data in the TRACON when the team
supervisor for arrival functions excitedly told me to get my headset and relieve another controller
on arrival radar 1. I was unaware that this controller had just been involved in a systems error and
near midair collision. Thinking him to be possibly ill, I plugged in with him to "get the picture." He
pointed out aircraft A, 6 miles northeast heading 180 at 2300 ft. He said "A is going for a visual"
and continued to point out two or three other aircraft. He was visibly upset so I assumed the
position and asked aircraft A if he had the field in sight. He replied, "Affirmative" so I cleared him
for a visual approach, sent him to the tower and continued to work my traffic. The following
Tuesday, I was informed that while researching the systems error-package, the Assistant Chief
discovered that the weather was below visual approach minimums when A was cleared for a visual
approach. The weather was M18OVCST while our minimum is 1900 ft ceiling.
Coordination among sectors was the cause of a recent potential conflict involving two
corporate aircraft.
7. Submitted by corporate pDot:
My aircraft, A, was on IFR flight plan to Sidley Airport at 6000 ft MSL. At approximately
1645 hours, Memphis Center cleared aircraft A for the approach to SZY to descend and maintain
2800 ft until the SZY radio beacon. Aircraft A descended normally to 2800 ft; upon reaching SZY
we turned outbound to a 330° bearing and began descent to initial approach altitude of 2100 ft
MSL. At 2500 ft MSL aircraft A was below the overcast. We cancelled IFR and turned back to the
airport. At 3 miles at straight in approach to runway 16, aircraft A made a call for a 3 mile straight
in approach to runway 16, Sidley.
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At this time aircraft B made a call that he was entering crosswind for runway 16 and had
aircraft A in sight. Both aircraft landed uneventfully.
After landing, the pilot of aircraft B indicated that Center had cleared him for 3000 MSL for
approach and he had also cancelled upon breaking out of the overcast. Aircraft B was approaching
from the west and aircraft A from the east. Center (two different sectors) had apparently cleared
both aircraft to approximately the same altitude (3000 and 2800, respectively) at approximately
the same ETA over SZY RBN. Neither aircraft was aware of the other's presence. Had ceilings been
lower and both aircraft been forced to execute the full approach, a potential conflict situation
would have existed.
Frequency usage was associated with another problem, during the decombination of two
sectors.
8. Submitted by air traffic controller:
We were in the process of decombining the arrival and departure positions. The aircraft
involved in the incident was an A inbound to the Dayton Airport on the 24R localizer and
aircraft B inbound to Piqua Airport on a converging course, northwest bound. Aircraft A was
cleared to descend from 4000 to 3000 by the arrival controller, and the pilot acknowledged by
saying, "all right." I, working with departure position, was controlling aircraft B at 6000 and he
requested lower. I coordinated with arrival for the converging A traffic and was told I could descend
to 4000. I then cleared B to descend to 4000.
A few minutes later Aircraft A reported seeing the traffic in front of him. I did not realize
aircraft A was even on my frequency and advised him that the traffic was at 4000 and to contact
approach control on the proper frequency. He said he was also level at 4000 and switched over to
approach frequency. Both aircraft had already crossed courses.
The pilot of Aircraft A should have read back the clearance to 3000 and stated his call sign.
The arrival controller should have made certain the pilot received the clearance by getting a proper
acknowledgment.
It should also be noted that aircraft A was still on departure frequency when the positions
were decombined. When the arrival controller turned off the departure frequency and began to use
arrival frequencies, he was unable to contact aircraft A in two attempts to verify his altitude. I think
when positions are combined, all aircraft should be on one frequency to the extent possible with
regard to transmitter capabilities.
PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES
Procedures and practices of both pilots and air traffic controllers may become a problem under
conditions of high workload. It is in such circumstances that judgment factors often become
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important in determining whether a problem becomes an incident. The next several reports
illustrate examples of these factors.
9. Submitted by air traffic controller:
Air Carrier Aircraft A from Rochester to Minneapolis cruising at 10,000 ft. Aircraft B inbound
to Minneapolis on Jl 13 descending from FL330.
Time: 0162Z: Initial contact from Aircraft B descending to 240.1 cleared him for high profile
descent to cross 38 miles southeast of Minneapolis at 7000. We remained inbound on J113.
Time: 0133Z: Aircraft A called off RST climbing to 10,000 heading 320 vectors for
Minneapolis.
Time: 0134Z: It was soon obvious that Aircraft B was overtaking Aircraft A so Aircraft B was
recleared to 11,000 ft. B was on a high profile descent so he was too high to utilize speed control
effectively. A was issued heading 345° while B was going directly to the airport headed about 320°.
This was a delaying vector for A to allow B to overtake him.
Time: 0135Z: B was told to maintain 11,000 ft. A was level at 10,000.
Time: 0136Z: A told to cross 38 miles southeast of MSP at 7,000.
Time: 0136Z: A told to turn right heading 360. No acknowledgment. A told again to turn
right heading 010 and reduce speed to 250 knots. At this time A was converging on B at about a
70° or 60° angle at 250 knots. B was in A's twelve o'clock position 5 miles.
Time: 0137Z: Aircraft A asked what was his traffic. At this time Mode C indicated B had not
stopped at 11,000. I asked B his altitude; he said "11,000." Mode C now showed him level at
10,000. B was told to turn right heading 360 maintain 11,000 immediately. A then said he was
going to 9500 ft. A was told to maintain 9000 immediately.
Time: 0138Z: B was level at 7000. The aircraft passed at the altitude within 1 mile or less. In a
phone conversation later, the pilot of Aircraft B said they never reset the altitude alert going from
7000 to 11,000 ft and they must have been waiting for the gong. The pilot of aircraft A said they
passed mighty close.
Although sea-level barometric pressures often do not vary enough from standard to make an
appreciable difference in air traffic control, they can and did do so on several occasions during the
past winter. Two reports involving failure to reset altimeters follow.
10. Submitted by corporate pilot:
The flight was cleared to climb to FL200 direct to VOR. During climb at approximately
15,000, the flight was recleared to an NDB. The NDB was tuned and signal received; the direction
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the ADF needle pointed didn't make sense. The station identification was rechecked and confirmed.
About that time a rather loud report was heard indicating some sort of structural damage. Both I
and my copilot did a quick check of warning lights and what we could see from the cockpit:
Everything seemed to be in order so Center was asked for a vector because we couldn't comply with
the direct routing. Qearance was changed and the flight proceeded according to the new clearance.
We were in the process of leveling at 20,000 ft when Center came back and told us we were
instructed to climb to 200. At first our reply was that we would level at 200 then I realized that
with the confusion I had passed 18,000 without resetting the altimeter to 2992. Due to the low
barometric pressure that day, we were several hundred feet too high. After resetting the altimeter
the flight continued. The report heard turned out to be a broken bolt in the door lifting mechanism
which had nothing to do with the integrity of the airplane. The problem with the NDB was simply
distance from it.
The basic problem was too many things going on at once so resetting the altimeter at 18,000 ft
was missed. Two things could have reduced the workload. The copilot could have been flying the
airplane so the Captain who was making the decision would not have had to think about flying too.
The problem with this is there are times when having the copilot fly can be more demanding than
doing the flying. ATC could have given a simpler clearance (e.g., radar vector) that didn't require
looking up information right away. The route change was not a problem until the facility to be used
turned out to be out of range, and then the workload increased considerably.
11. Submitted by air carrier pilot:
We were about 200 miles from LGA and were given descent to FL190 with no expected
crossing altitude later. The descent was at pilot's discretion. In the descent, turbulence changed
from light to moderate so I was in no hurry to get to a lower altitude, as turbulence had increased as
we descended. About FL220, we were given descent to 9000 on a DME fix from Milton .VOR,
which we could not receive satisfactorily. Qearance was then changed to a crossing restriction on
the JFK VOR. At about 80 DME from JFK we were given clearance to 9000 ft, to cross the JFK
55 DME at or below 10,000 ft. We advised ATC that we didn't know if we could do it or not but
we'd try. We received no definite statement in reply, so we began a rapid power-off speed brake
descent to 9000 ft, still in moderate turbulence. There was some confusion involving a "How do
you read this transmitter," a frequency change, and an off-course vector in the latter position of
descent. We leveled off at 9000, and made the restriction. We immediately noticed the improper
altimeter setting (29.92 instead of 29.15) and immediately climbed to 9000 ft. This had put us at
an altitude of 8300 ft instead of 9000 ft. I do not believe ATC was aware of this deviation because
there was no question or comment from them.
Causes: (1) Early descent with no expected crossing altitude. I do not believe this would have
happened if we had an expected crossing altitude or an arrival when altitudes and speeds depicted.
(2) Rapid descent in moderate turbulence was distracting in that the crew focused most of its
attention on aircraft control, attitude, and speed. The aircraft was on autopilot and it seemed that
all attention was focused on a rapid descent to crossing altitude. (3) Crew missed resetting
altimeters at 18,000 ft. No excuses... I do feel that we had not been given the chance to properly
prepare and plan for the clearance we were given. (4) Weather: If the east coast had not been under
the influence of a deep low pressure area, the altitude deviation would have been much less. I have
seen this problem occur before but it doesn't normally cause large altitude deviations. Perhaps
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complacency about resetting altimeters is a factor here. Turbulence greatly complicated matters in
this case. Recommendations: Most of all, I believe that when descent clearance to below 18,000 is
given, one of the altimeters should be set to local barometric setting. Present procedures do not
provide for this. Granted there were several other contributing factors, this was not an isolated case
and a procedure such as this should at least be studied. I do not suggest that ATC was at fault, but
they were no help. Basically, I do not believe that crew coordination was a major factor in that
there was no lack of communications or cooperation either before or after this incident. The
remainder of the flight was uneventful all the way to touchdown at La Guardia except for almost
continuous turbulence.
// is well known that pilot expectations arc important in determining pilot behavior. A brief
report makes this point clearly.
12. Submitted by air traffic controller:
Aircraft A, a single engine high performance airplane, VFR flight plan from over SBJ via JFK
to RVH and then to destination. Aircraft A checked in with Newark and was assigned
SBJ-JFK-RVH at 2500 ft. Aircraft was transferred to JFK TCA controller approximately 10 miles
southwest of La Guardia VOR. Communications transfer took longer than usual and pilot wound
up 2 miles southwest of La Guardia at 2500ft mixed in with IFR and .VFR traffic landing
La Guardia runway 31. Aircraft was issued 3500 and a heading of 150 to get him away from
La Guardia traffic. When questioned as to why pilot was over La Guardia instead of JFK as cleared,
pilot asked for JFK VOR frequency and then replied that he had tuned the LGA VOR instead of
Kennedy because that is the route he had requested. When he was issued the JFK.VOR route, he
stated he failed to change the VOR frequency to Kennedy.
Most pilots attempt to give their passengers the most interesting ride possible. On occasion,
however, deviations from assigned routes may become a problem for Air Traffic Control. An
example of such a pilot practice follows.
13. Submitted by air traffic controller:
An air carrier jet was flying LAX J189 SEA. At Crater Lake, OR, the aircraft made a drastic
heading change (approximately 325 to 270) without advising the Controller. The heading change
placed the aircraft at least 5 miles west of course on a heading that was rapidly increasing this
distance. No other traffic was involved. This was the second such occurrence on this shift. I have
witnessed many such deviations over Crater Lake, even when aircraft were on an assigned vector
heading. Flight crews should obtain clearance to deviate from assigned route or heading.
Note: It happened again today: Same type aircraft northbound, assigned vector of 340, turned
to 360 without requesting or advising he was going to deviate. When questioned about heading
change pilot said, "We were taking a little scenic tour."
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Problem is: that these deviations occur very near a boundary between two sectors. Traffic from
SFO to PDX/SEA is controlled by sector 15, and aircraft are often vectored in close proximity to
sector 14/15 boundary. Deviation in the vicinity of Crater Lake can place a sector 15 aircraft within
3 miles of the boundary.
ASRS has received a number of reports from pilots complaining of the necessity for very high
rate descents in a number of areas. On occasion, the requested descent exceeds the aircraft's
capabilities. The following two reports demonstrate two quite different pilot reactions to receiving
such clearances.
14. Submitted by air carrier pilot:
Flight 123, CMI-IAD: While descending into Dulles, center held us at 230 until approximately
15-20n. mi. west of FRR and then cleared us to cross 10 east of FRR at 8000. The power was
reduced and spoilers deployed. At approximately 6 n. mi. east of FRR Center asked us if we were
going to make the crossing restriction. There was some exchange of conversation as to the late
clearance and also our aircraft configuration. In trying to make the restriction the airspeed
restriction of 250 knots below 10,000 was exceeded. We crossed 11 n. mi. east of FRR at 8000 but
airspeed was in excess of 250 knots. The airspeed was reduced as soon as possible when pressuriza-
tion and aircraft were stabilized in normal configuration. Rapid descent caused some passenger
discomfort due to outrunning cabin pressure altitude.
A normal descent should have been started approximately 50 to 60 n. mi. west of Front Royal
to cross 10 east at 8000. I do believe center has a normal crossing restriction of 40 n. mi. west of
FRR at 230. Factors involved here were a late descent clearance, preoccupation with making the
crossing restriction, and the conversation regarding the restriction. The cabin pressurization problem
due to rapid descent was also distracting. In hindsight I believe trying to make the crossing
restriction would have been the top priority over the airspeed restriction in a loss of communica-
tions situation, although this did not occur. Another factor was a rather strong tailwind which I
don't believe the controller knew about. No evasive action was required.
15. Submitted by air carrier pilot:
We were level at FL270, having descended from 370 in accordance with previously issued
clearance. At 17 DME west of HAR, eastbound, we received a clearance to "descend so as to cross
HAR VOR at and maintain 17,000." It was not possible to descend this quickly. We advised Center
and received an alternate clearance. This is a continuing problem with ATC in this sector on this
airway.
Any clearance from ATC which is outside the normal performance capabilities of the aircraft is
an exercise in futility. It requires a refusal by the pilot and a revised clearance from the controller.
The increased workload on both increases the chance for error. It is also conducive to an attempt by
the pilot to "Give it the old college try" who may discover too late to get a revised clearance that he
cannot make the crossing restriction.
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Recommendation: Controller should be thoroughly schooled in performance capabilities of all
aircraft they control and all ATC clearances should be tailored to fit these performance capabilities.
The concept that pilots and controllers each provide redundancy for the other in the ATC
situation is often mentioned in ASRS reports, although it is believed that the potential uses of this
approach have not been explored systematically. One of the best examples of a case in which one of
the two was operating on incorrect information and the problem was detected by the other is cited
below. Another example is cited on page 32.
16. Submitted by air carrier pilot:
Approaching Fresno, weather 800 overcast 2 in fog, ATIS information indicated ILS 29R. We
departed cruise altitude for 9000, 30 DME north of Fresno. Passing 12,000, the controller inquired
if we wanted a back course localizer 11L as the wind was 180 at 5 knots. After checking the cabin
and assuring the flight attendants were through with their service, and also confirming that the
weather was above back course minimums, we accepted and applied full speed brakes to get down
and on profile. Due to the quick changeover and limited time available, I requested the first officer
to read me the transition to the backcourse. He did so ... I performed the necessary procedures,
intercepted the backcourse and crossed Buckles at about 4500. The minimum altitude was then
1500ft to Shaw. Prior to crossing Buckles, the controller and the first officer had a discussion
about our heading. I was busy flying the back course and going from full speed brake to 2° flaps, so
I didn't really understand the entire conversation about our heading. Passing through 1800 ft. the
"controller issued a turn to 180 and climb to 2000. We complied with this immediately and once
level, I inquired why we were "pulled up" and given these instructions. The controller said we were
10 miles north of FAT VOR and on a heading of 115° we would soon be in the "high" country. He
stated the 180 heading was to position us properly on the back course. We then quickly checked
our VHP nav receivers, double checked identification and ADF/VOR function switches and from all
indications we were about 8 miles south of the VOR. He argued that we were north of rhe VOR on
his radar. We suggested that he could possibly have the wrong aircraft; he replied we were the only
Code 0400 In the area. We again checked our receiver and centered the FPDI on the VOR. At this
time we were 10 DME on the 177 degree radial. He said we were now passing abeam the VOR. We
told him exactly where we were according to our equipment and that one of us was wrong. After a
fairly long silence, he replied that he had checked with the tower's "BRITE display" and they
confirmed that we were right and showed us just south of Chandler airport. We then got several
vectors to position us for an ILS 29 approach which we completed without difficulty. After
reaching the gate, I called the watch supervisor. All he could tell me was that they had recently
changed the range and obviously it was 10 miles off. He had called maintenance und written the
incident up. I advised him that I intended to report this to NASA and our own safety program as a
lesson for all pilots to learn from.
Tlie following report, which discusses controller terminology with respect to altitude restric-
tions, is another illustration of <i potential problem that has been cited by ASRS and others
throughout the past year.
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17. Submitted by air carrier pilot:
Geared by Washington Center to cross 25 miles northeast of GSO at 8QOO while on a direct
course to GSO on the 043 degree radial. At about the time I was crossing victor 266 Center cleared
me to 6000 with no comments or crossing restrictions. As a point of interest I told the Center that I
was going to make the 25-n. mi. restriction at 8000, however, I wanted to know if it had been his
intent to cancel the 8000 restriction. The controller seemed chagrined at my question and assured
me that the restriction did apply and his intention was not to cancel it. I then asked him about the
"new" phraseology in which clearance to a new altitude without specifying previous restrictions
cancels those restrictions. Again he was a little sheepish in his reply as he admitted that I was
correct. Now I hope this report does not embarrass this gentleman as I feel that he is a victim of
gobbledegook. It is begging for trouble to use phraseology which requires an exact interpretation by
the pilot and by the controller. Center frequencies are not so busy that a controller can't say
"Cancel previous restriction" or "Previous restrictions apply." This is a severe hazard and it should
be stopped now. If it is not, and if everyone gets used to it, complacency will set in sometime in the
future and someone is going to forget the proper interpretation. The results could be disastrous.
Two additional reports are cited that take issue with current ATC procedures. While both
reports emanate from occurrences at Los Angeles International Airport, only the first is specific to
that site. The second concerns a more general problem of runway usage.
18. Submitted by air carrier pilot:
This report is in regard to an ATC clearance procedure used frequently by Los Angeles Tower.
Normally, departing jet aircraft receive a pre-taxi clearance to maintain FL230 via a SID departure
such as Ocean 2 or Seal Beach 5, etc. Then, the non-standard happens, when with the takeoff
clearance or sometimes on takeoff roll, LAX tower issues a "Maintain 2000 ft" restriction. It was
stated this was required by IFR departing aircraft from Torrance Airport. This is particularly
unsatisfactory and could be unsafe for departing jets for the following reasons: (1) Maintaining
2000 ft assigned compromises the SID lost communication procedure, putting the aircraft into
FAR 91.127 regarding altitude. The SID lost communications says maintain heading 210 to 3000 ft
before turning, then climb. Communications failure keeps the aircraft at 2000 on SID routing until
entering MEA approaching SLI and for a full 10 minutes before unrestricted climb. This would
cause a lot of complications in the Orange County, El Toro area. (2) It compromises our required
aircraft anti-noise climb departure procedure ...
19. Submitted by air carrier pilot:
Upon landing, observed commuter carrier aircraft taking off from same runway at same time.
Separation of aircraft given as 8000 ft by tower. Weather overcast, bases approximately 500 ft, tops
approximately 1500 ft.
Spoke to watch supervisor; I was told that he thought separation was adequate, with which I
agree unless a missed approach is required for whatever reason. At that point my faster aircraft and
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the slower aircraft would be attempting to fly in essentially the same airspace at the same time. This
airspace would probably have been in the cloud layer over the area.
At the current time it appears that approaches and departures are authorized without regard to
possible conflicts due to missed approaches. The assumption is that all approaches will be
completed. It is standard procedure to clear takeoffs and landings at Las Vegas from runways with
conflicting headings. This also sets up a conflict should a missed approach be executed. In Reno,
aircraft are cleared for approaches in airspace which would have to be used in the event of missed
approach, before preceding aircraft are on the ground. These examples serve to illustrate that the
missed approach is not planned for. We are playing games with the odds.
EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
Previous reports and many articles in the Aviation Press have described the problems that
occur due to inadvertent actuation of emergency locator transmitters. This report cites an example
of such actuation and its effect on an IFR flight.
20. Submitted by corporate pilot:
This flight was on an IFR flight plan from St. Petersburg, FL to Raleigh-Durham, NC. I had
just been transferred from Jacksonville Center control to Jacksonville approach control and had
transmitted flight number and altitude to JAX approach with acknowledgment from approach. At
altitude and location specified above, I first noticed considerable noise (resembling numerous
ambulance sirens) coming from the number 2 comm receiver. At this point I surmised that
someone's microphone below had become stuck. The sound continued so I switched to the other
comm set. The same sound continued. It was at this time that I surmised that my ELT had gone off.
I could not raise approach control due to all the horrible noise and both VOR NAV receivers were
absolutely .unusable. With the control switch for the ELT being outside the aircraft, it was
impossible for me to disconnect or turn off the unit. I did finally manage to call JAX and by
keeping the receiver as high as possible I was barely able to discern information from the Center.
Conditions were undercast below and I informed the Center that I would proceed to IDU as
planned assuming that I would be able to raise enroute controllers. The DME, transponder and ADF
continued to function, but the ELT noise from the communications receivers was almost unbear-
able. The flight was completed and the ELT turned off after landing at RDU. Such a situation in
high density traffic under extreme IFR conditions could prove disastrous due to lack of adequate
communication and navigation equipment.
The malfunctioning unit was an early model which had badly corroded. A new unit was
installed as a replacement. For safety reasons, I feel that ELTs should have control switches in the
cockpit area to eliminate such situations as I have referred to above. It would be much safer to turn
the unit off than to have an inadvertent actuation of the ELT in difficult traffic or weather
conditions. Apparently this condition has happened to other unfortunate pilots as well.
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Several reports during the past few months have described air carrier or corporate turbojet
aircraft operating without transponder or without Mode C capability by advance arrangement with
Air Traffic Control. Two examples of the problems which can occur in this configuration are cited
below.
21. Submitted by air carrier pilot:
I was serving as pilot in command on a scheduled air carrier operation. We received the airplane
at ABC and flew it to GHI with an intermediate stop at DEF. When we boarded the aircraft it was
observed that the Captain's corrected air data system (CADS) was placarded inoperative. With this
situation the aircraft operating manual requires that the automatic altitude reporting feature of the
transponder be turned off at 6000 ft. After consulting the appropriate MEL we determined that the
flight could operate without the altitude reporting feature with ATC's approval. ATC was advised of
our problem through clearance delivery at ABC. The flight departed and proceeded to DEF at
FL250 without problem. At DEF the same method of informing ATC was used and another
clearance was received to GHI at FL290. The flight from DEF to GHI differed from the previous leg
in that two Centers were involved, whereas the first leg only involved one Center. It was assumed
that the first Center would communicate the transponder problem to the second Center. When the
first center handed us off to the second at FL290 the controller advised that flight above 12,500 ft
was not authorized without prior approval. We informed that we knew this and that prior request
for approval had been made. The flight continued to GHI without further incident. The problems
which precipitated this occurrence seemed to me as follows: (1) Poor maintenance action. Correc-
tion of this condition had been deferred from the previous day and the aircraft had been flown a
considerable number of hours through several maintenance stations. (2) A breakdown of communi-
cation between maintenance and dispatch. Dispatch was uninformed of this inoperative system until
I advised them of it. This piece of equipment should have been included in the remark section of
the dispatch release as should all inoperative components which impose an operational problem.
This one was not. (3) A complete lack of airline procedure to handle this situation relative to ATC.
What information is available to the cockpit crew member is either-vague or obscure. (4) The lack of
adequate information transferred from Center to Center. It is quite common to be handed off from
one controller to another and the new controller not even be advised of such things as assigned
headings, altitude change, inoperative equipment, and true airspeed change by the previous
controller.
22. Submitted by ATC controller:
Aircraft departing had inoperative altitude readout on Mode C transponder. AB123 was a
departure out of DFW during heavy rain storm. I was working him as a departure radar controller in
the Ft. Worth Center. He asked for a southwest deviation due to weather. I asked AB123 his
altitude and I thought he said 170. As he was out of 170 I approved the deviation and pointed him
out to the AQN arrival sector. AQN arrival pointed out AB456 inbound to DFW leaving FL279.1
watched AB456 descend and kept track of his altitude so I could be sure that AB123 was above
him. When AB456 was leaving 16500 DFW departure asked the altitude of AB123.1 automatically
asked AB123 his altitude expecting it to be at least 190 (still no altitude readout). AB123 replied
that he was leaving 13,000. I immediately stopped him at 14,000 and turned him right. AB456
stopped at 15,000 and also turned right. The above evasive action was taken and thereby averted a
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possible collision. I know that if the first aircraft's altitude readout had been working this situation
would have never occurred. I think that if the Mode C altitude readout is not working it should be
brought to the attention of all concerned any time it goes out.
The next report, from a general aviation pilot, illustrates one problem of winter operations in
light aircraft.
23. Submitted by general aviation pilot:
I noticed my oil temperature gauge reading high. On my next check my temperature had
reached the red area and the oil pressure had dropped below a safe level. I reduced rpm's from 2400
to 2000 to try to cool the engine. I made a 180° turn to the nearest airport and landed without
incident. The oil quantity checked normal. I grounded the aircraft until checked by a mechanic
(100 hour inspection was scheduled for the next week). This is a club aircraft which is maintained
to a strict time and use schedule. There was no apparent reason for the occurrence, but I was very
happy I had kept an eye on the oil gauges.
Mechanic's report during 100 hour inspection: Cold weather engine kit was still on the aircraft
and lightweight oil was still in use. The weather had wanned considerably and the combination
added up to low oil pressure and high oil temperature.
Finally, a report by an Air Carrier passenger who is also a general aviation pilot makes note of
a potential cabin safety issue in air carrier aircraft.
24. Submitted by passenger:
The following is one occurrence, illustrative of a widespread situation with potentially serious
implications for passengers and cabin attendants. During the period after pushback from the gate
and before pre-takeoff safety announcement, the cabin attendants passed out stereo earphones. In
the event of a need for emergency evacuation after this point in flight, these lengthy (approximately
40 inch) cords could entangle passengers trying to make a rapid emergency exit. The same could
also be said for cabin attendants during the conduct of their emergency duties. Since the
introduction of passenger stereo, I have observed this practice numerous times and on many
different scheduled carriers. Even though the need for emergency evacuation is remote, it seems to
me stereo headsets should not be passed out at least until cruise altitude is reached and should be
collected before the start of final approach. There is plenty of cabin attendant time for this on the
longer flights where headsets are passed out. Passengers could be told that it's in their best interest if
they want to listen during the time headsets were not being provided under the above mentioned
procedural change.
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JUDGMENT FACTORS
Our previous quarterly report included a number of examples involving judgment under the
heading "Why Pilots and Controllers Get Gray." Although the title is facetious, those previously
reported examples and the ones that follow here, are representative of the sort of problems that are
most difficult to deal with.
Three reports illustrate pilot judgment factors. While the motivation was very different in the
three cases, all three represent, at best, questionable judgment.
25. Submitted by general aviation pilot:
I was circling the local college watching a ball game doing 720° steep turns. Altitudes varying
between 1400 and 1100 ft MSL. I was rolling from one bank to the other. Nothing I was doing I felt
hazardous to pilot or those on the ground. I was in the area for 20 minutes which is the reason I
believe I annoyed a number of people, who called the control tower and those around. The weather
was CAVU and the time was dusk. I believe the extended time in the area was the reason for the
reporting of flying "low," doing "loops," "rolls," and other such violent maneuvers over a town. I
am innocent of any such violations, although I admit flying below 1400 ft (100 ft AGL) for small
periods of time, possibly steeper than 60° bank and turns, and acrobatic maneuvers over town and
below 1500 AGL during steep banks.
26. Reported by flight student, total time of 305 hours:
This event occurred during a training flight which originated from Santa Monica Airport and
included a stop-over at a nearby airport to pick up the school's assistant chief pilot. Shortly after
takeoff and power adjustment I was instructed to put on a hood and continue the flight under
simulated IFR conditions. I had just leveled off and was putting the aircraft into a slow flight
configuration. At this time I heard the throbbing sound of another aircraft's engine. I looked at my
instructor while attempting to look outside and found he was turned around talking to his
employer; he had been this way a good part of the flight. At this time the individual in the back saw
the aircraft we had nearly collided with and said to the instructor, "You'd better do something."
The instructor pulled back on the elevator control, I let go of the controls and the collision was
averted. We came within 35 ft of an aircraft close to our flight path. This incident could have been
avoided if the instructor had been performing his duty; the most important in this case, where I was
wearing a hood, was to look for other traffic and not worry about his employer in the backseat. The
assistant chief pilot in the back should have kept his mouth closed and let his instructor do his job.
It also would have been prudent if they hadn't included company business with my IFR training
flight.
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27. Submitted by a charter pilot:
While on final approach to runway 4 left I was given a go-around without a reason by the
tower, which I complied with. On my second approach, on base leg, I was asked if I had a green
light condition for my gear and I replied that it was coming down at that time. When I got on the
ground and back to the gate, there was a message for me to call the tower. When I called the tower
the chief asked me if I had forgotten to lower my gear. I told him that I had not forgotten but that
I was dropping the gear late on purpose. The chief seemed satisfied with my explanation and asked
me to inform them the next time I desired a delayed gear extension.
Reason for delayed extension: I work for a Part 135 scheduled service. We fly twin engine
aircraft which have a quick extension system for the gear. We are paid from a Hobbs meter which
stops counting when the gear is lowered. It is my procedure to lower the gear relatively late. On this
particular flight I was empty so I held off lowering the gear a little longer. On the average, we make
16—20 landings in a day. If you save 2 to 3 minutes on each landing through late gear extension you
make $8.00 to $10.00 more a day and $40.00 to $50.00 more a week that you would not have
made by extending the gear further out.
Finally, three reports illustrate situations in which combinations of circumstances conspired to
prevent the system from running smoothly.
28. Submitted by air traffic controller:
Military aircraft A enroute from Moffett, Southland five departure, Salinas transition, called
Oakland Sector 10 over Salinas at 7000. Airline aircraft B landing Monterey runway 28 was
descending to land on vectors to the runway head-on with aircraft A. No separation was lost but
Center was not talking to airline aircraft and aircraft A was under Oakland Sector 23 control.
Aircraft A was not handed off to Sector 10 by Sector 23. Sector 10 was not aware of aircraft A in
the Sector until aircraft A called. Sector 23 was very busy with other traffic and through a
misunderstanding between manual and radar controllers, aircraft A wasn't handed off. This was
automation-oriented too, first through the standard practice of positioning handed off data blocks
in the PHI position, and second in that the automatic handoff feature did not function in this
instance. Assuming strip posting could have warned Sector 10 of aircraft A's time over Salinas so
that Sector 10 could have planned the situation but this didn't occur. Somehow all the warning
devices or "crutches" failed and when a handoff wasn't made a deviation occurred. The deviation is
being investigated.
29. Submitted by air carrier pilot:
DEF Flight 456 arriving O'Hare from over CGT, V-7 SOXES, Radar vectors O'Hare landing
14 right. There was a north-south line of thunderstorms moving east over O'Hare. Our vector was
northwest through the line with a left turn to runway 14 right ILS final for landing. Thunderstorm
was overhead at time of landing. DEF was proceeding north between two well-defined cells on the
airborne weather radar when given a vector northwest into the left cell. Frequency was extremely
congested. DEF requested to deviate north to avoid cell. Refused due to traffic. DEF requested
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lower altitude to get below cell, refused. Numerous other aircraft requesting deviations to avoid
weather. DEF was given a vector west at 8000 ft. DEF 456 answered transmission to descend to
5000 ft MSL and turn southwest. After we were heading southwest at approximately 6000 ft, radar
asked our heading and altitude. They told us to maintain 6000 ft and immediately initiate a turn to
the north. It seems the transmission had been for ABC number 456. Even after we were apprised
that ABC 456 was on frequency there was still some confusion due to extreme congestion on the
frequency. DEF 456 had turned into final traffic on 14 right. 1 was operating the radios on
DEF 456 and had prefixed all replies with my company name. This was not the fault of the
approach controller; there were far too many aircraft on the frequency for the thunderstorm
weather conditions existing at the time. Flights should have been vectored around the cells and
required to hold to prevent this congestion. It was beyond human capability for an individual to
give and receive that number of transmissions in the time span available. This congestion creates a
very hazardous situation.
30. Submitted by air traffic controller:
I was working Sector 7 radar and had been working about 5 minutes when Sector 15 said they
were going into holding. We gave the next four aircraft to Sector 15 which would fill all their
altitudes. Aircraft A was the first aircraft that I held at Smity intersection at FL240. The flight
ahead of A was descending slowly and didn't look like the sector was going to descend the aircraft
below 240 so I stopped A at FL250. Narrowband radar started to drop in and out several times.
Aircraft B was the second aircraft enroute holding in Smity intersection descending to FL260.
Aircraft C was the third aircraft enroute to holding at Smity descending to 270. Aircraft D was the
fourth aircraft at 280.1 had other aircraft enroute to Smity intersection with holding instructions at
all altitudes up to F1310. I was trying to display the hold list in the top part of the radar scope but
the narrowband radar kept dropping out so after the third time I gave up. It was about this time
that Sector 15 requested the next two aircraft so my interphone controller initiated radar handoffs
on aircraft A and aircraft B. I descended A to FL240 to report leaving 250. Aircraft A reported
leaving 250 so I gave then to Sector 15 frequency. I descended aircraft B to 250 report leaving 260.
Aircraft B reported leaving 260 so I descended aircraft C to 260 report leaving 270. Aircraft C
reported leaving 270. I descended aircraft D to 270 report leaving 280. Aircraft C reported leaving
280 at about the time the team supervisor came over and said that Sector 15 didn't want a radar
handoff until the aircraft was in the hold list. Aircraft B was still flashing at Sector 15.1 tried to
take the handoff back but Sector 15 had just taken the handoff. I told the supervisor that we
weren't getting any altitude information. We had two flights coming on frequency and the one
flight I re-routed to avoid the inbound route. The other set of parallel tracks at FL390 was flashing
at me. We didn't have any strips because the computer was behind with two start-overs. Then we
started to get two and three strips on the same aircraft.
A departure aircraft from adjacent sector began to flash at us. I told my intercom controller to
re-route the aircraft around our sector. Then Sector 15 called and asked if we were still working
aircraft C and my interphone said yes; Sector 15 said descend C to FL210 and given them to us. I
looked over at the strips and aircraft C was the bottom strip at 260 so I descended him to FL210 to
report leaving 250 and 240. Aircraft C reported leaving FL260 so I descended aircraft D to 260.
Aircraft D reported leaving 270 then I got a radar handoff on 3 aircraft parallel at FL390.
Aircraft C reported leaving 250 so I descended aircraft E to 250 and aircraft D reported leaving 260.
Then aircraft B called and said you have us at FL250.1 thought at first it was aircraft F that called
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us so I verified his clearance, then aircraft B called again. I looked for a strip and didn't have one.
Then I remembered that he was in the holding pattern and had aircraft B ident. Aircraft C reported
leaving FL240 so I gave them Sector 15 frequency. Realizing that I had descended aircraft F to 250
I requested his altitude and he said he was at FL250.1 descended aircraft F to 240 immediately and
gave him traffic as one o'clock and 15 miles going around the back side of the pattern. Since 1 had
not terminated radar we had 7 to Smiles between aircraft C and aircraft B and 9 to 10 miles
between aircraft B and aircraft F. Since Sector 15 had taken the handoff on aircraft B when the
aircraft was over Smity intersection the full data block went into Sector 15's hold list and off my
scope and my interphone controller had taken the strip down when he took the strip down for
Aircraft A.
First, the strip should not have been taken down until the aircraft had acknowledged the
frequency change. Also, if the hold list was the same intensity as the full data block instead of being
connected with the limited.data block and at only one-half intensity, Sector 15 might have realized
aircraft B was still in their hold list and at FL250. It might be better not to have a preset place for
the hold list because every time the narrowband radar drops and comes back, it comes back to the
preset position and not where you might want it or have had it.
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APPENDIX C
EXTRACTS FROM AIRMAN'S INFORMATION MANUAL
AND
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL HANDBOOK
AIRMAN'S INFORMATION MANUAL
Part 1, Chapter 3 (July 1977)
SERVICES AVAILABLE TO PILOTS
FAA HANDBOOK 7110.65,
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL
(October 1, 1977)
RADAR TRAFFIC INFORMATION SERVICE SECTION 18. ADDITIONAL SERVICES
1. A service provided by radar air traffic
control facilities. Pilots receiving this service
are advised of any radar target observed on the
radar display which may be in such proximity
to the position of their aircraft or its intended
route of flight that it warrants their atten-
tion . . .
a. Purpose of the Service: The issuance of
traffic information ... is based on the principle
of ... advising a pilot that a particular radar
target — warrants his attention — to alert
the pilot so that he can be on the lookout for
it...
511. TRAFFIC INFORMATION: Unless
an aircraft is operating within positive con-
trolled airspace or omission is requested by the
pilot, issue traffic information to aircraft on
your frequency when in your judgment their
proximity may diminish to less than applicable
separation minima .. .
510. APPLICATION: Provide additional
services to the extent possible contingent only
upon your capability to fit it into the perfor-
mance of higher priority duties ...
(Par. 22. DUTY PRIORITY: Give first
priority to separation of aircraft as required in
this handbook and to the issuance of safety
advisories. Give second priority to other ser-
vices that are required but do not involve sepa-
ration of aircraft. Give third priority to addi-
tional services to the extent possible.)
Note to par. 510: The primary purpose of
the ATC System is to prevent a collision
between aircraft operating in the system and to
organize and expedite the flow of traffic. In
addition to its primary function, the ATC
system has the capability to provide (with cer-
tain limitations) additional services ... Con-
sistent with the aforementioned limitations,
controllers shall provide additional service pro-
cedures to the extent permitted by higher
duties and other circumstances. The provision
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of additional services is not optional on the
part of the controller, but rather is required,
when the work situation permits.
b. Provision of the Service'. Many factors
... could prevent the controller from providing
this service . . . The controller possesses com-
plete discretion for determining whether he is
able to provide or continue to provide this
service in a specific case. His reason against
providing .. . the service is not subject to ques-
tion nor need it be communicated to the pilot
... Traffic information is routinely provided to
all aircraft operating on IFR Right Plans ...
Traffic information may be provided to flights
not operating on IFR Flight Plans when
requested ...
Note: Participation by VFR pilots in for-
mal programs implemented at certain terminal
locations constitutes pilot request . . .
510 (cont'd) . . . and on the basis of the
following:
a. Factors such as limitations of the
radar, volume of traffic, frequency congestion
and workload.
b. You have complete discretion for
determining if you are able to provide or con-
tinue to provide a service in a particular case.
c. Your reason not to provide or continue
to provide a service in a particular case is not
subject to question by the pilot and need not
be made known to him.
SAFETY ADVISORY
A safety advisory will be issued to pilots
of aircraft being controlled by ATC if the con-
troller is aware the aircraft is at an altitude
which, in the controller's judgment, places the
aircraft in unsafe proximity to terrain, obstruc-
tions or other aircraft.
2. Aircraft Conflict Advisory. The con-
troller will immediately issue an advisory to the
pilot of an aircraft under his control if he is
aware of an aircraft that is not under his con-
trol at an altitude which, in the controller's
judgment, places both aircraft in unsafe prox-
imity to each other. With the alert the con-
troller will offer the pilot an alternate course of
action when feasible ...
The provision of this service is contingent
on the capability of the controller to have an
awareness of unsafe situations ... The issuance
of a safety advisory cannot be mandated, but it
can be expected on a reasonable, though inter-
609. SAFETY ADVISORY: Issue a
safety advisory to an aircraft under your con-
trol if you are aware the aircraft is at an alti-
tude which, in your judgement, places it in
unsafe procimity to ... other uncontrolled air-
craft. Do not assume that because someone else
has the control responsibility for the aircraft
that the unsafe situation has been observed and
the advisory issued — inform the appropriate
controller about i t . . . Inhibiting the computer-
generated MASW/EMSAW alert does not
relieve you of your responsibility to alert the
pilot...
b. ... With the advisory, offer the pilot
an alternate course of action when feasible.
Note: The issuance of a safety advisory is
contingent upon the capability of the con-
troller to have an awareness of situations
involving unsafe proximity to ... uncontrolled
aircraft The. issuance of a safety advisory can-
not be mandated, but it can be expected on a
reasonable, though intermittent, basis ... In
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mittent basis... This procedure is intended for
use in time-critical situations where aircraft
safety is in question. Noncritical situations
should be handled via the normal traffic advis-
ory procedures.
summary, because of the many factors affect-
ing the ability to observe a situation in which
unsafe proximity to — uncontrolled aircraft
may be developing, this paragraph does not
impose a duty to see the development of such
situations; it does require, however, that when
such a situation is known to exist, the pilot be
so advised.
TERMINAL RADAR PROGRAMS FOR VFR
AIRCRAFT
1. STAGE I SERVICE
a. In addition to the use of radar for the
control of IFR aircraft, Stage I facilities pro-
vide traffic information and limited vectoring
to VFR aircraft on a workload permitting
basis. . .
2. STAGE II SERVICE
a. The purpose of the service is to adjust
the flow of arriving VFR and IFR aircraft into
the traffic pattern in a safe and orderly manner
Section 19. STAGE I SERVICE
1240. APPLICATION: In addition to the
radar services prescribed elsewhere in Chap-
ter^ apply the procedures — in 1011 when
arriving VFR aircraft are handled by approach
control and provide vectoring service in accor-
dance with Ch. 4, section 4.
(1011. APPROACH CONTROL SERVICE
FOR VFR ARRIVING AIRCRAFT: Where
procedures have been established for arriving
VFR aircraft to contact approach control for
landing information, issue the following:
b. Traffic information on a workload per-
mitting basis . . .)
(Chapter 4, Sect. 4, VECTORING:
680. APPLICATION: a. Vector aircraft
for separation purposes, noise abatement ...
operational advantages to pilots or controllers,
or when requested ... Vector aircraft for sepa-
ration from other aircraft only within airspace
where you have control jurisdiction ...
Note: VFR aircraft may be vectored
regardless of altitude. It is the responsibility of
the pilot to comply with the provisions of any
applicable Federal Aviation Regulations.)
Section 20. STAGE II SERVICE
1250. APPLICATION: In addition to
stage I, apply stage II procedures at those loca-
tions where a program has been established for
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and to provide radar traffic information to
departing VFR aircraft. Pilot participation is
urged but it is not mandatory . . .
d. Standard radar separation will be pro-
vided between IFR aircraft . . . Standard radar
separation between VFR or between VFR and
IFR aircraft will not be provided . . .
f. Pilots of aircraf t t r a n s i t i n g the area . . .
will receive traffic informat ion on a controller
workload permi t t ing basis . . .
this purpose. If an aircraft desires the sen-ice
but cannot communicate on the appropriate
frequencies, provide the service to the extent
possible using an available frequency. Aircraft
which do not desire the service provided may
be fitted into the landing sequence by the
tower after coordination with approach con-
trol. Such aircraft shall, to the extent possible,
be given the same landing sequence they would
have received had they been sequenced by
radar vectors.
Note: This service is mandatory on the
controllers unless the pilot declares tha t he
does not want to participate . . .
1 2 5 1 . S E R V I C E A V A I L A B I L I T Y :
Inform aircraft on in i t ia l contact whenever this
service cannot be provided because of radar
outaee . . .
1260. HOLDING:
VFR aircraft . . .
You mav hold
3. STAGE III SERVICE
. . . The service is advertised in parts 3 and 4 of
the AIM . . .
a. ... The purpose of this service is to
provide separation between all participating
VFR aircraft and all IFR aircraft operating
within the ... TRSA. Pilot participation is
urged but it is not mandatory1 . . . •
Section 21. STAGE III SERVICE
1280. APPLICATION: In addition to
Stage II. apply Stage III procedures within the
designated Terminal Radar Service Area
(TRSA) or Terminal Control Area (TCA).
1281. ISSUANCE OF EFC: When VFR
aircraft are held either inside or outside of the
TRSA/TCA, inform the pilot when to expect
further clearance.
d. The TRSA is ... a radar environment
... however, this does not preclude application
of nonradar separation . ..
1282. SEPARATION: As appropriate,
separate aircraft in accordance with chapters 3,
4, 5 and 6 minima. Any of the following may
be applied within a TRSA/TCA.
Note: Assignment of radar headings,
routes or altitudes is based on the provision
that a pilot . . . VFR is expected to advise ATC
if compliance will cause him to violate any
FAR's.
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e. Visual separation is used when prevail-
ing conditions permit ...
f. Until visual separation is obtained,
standard vertical or radar separation will be
provided .. .
a. Visual separation, as specified in 796
and 1262.
Note: Radar or vertical separation must
be maintained until visual separation is gained.
b. 500 ft vertical separation between
VFR aircraft and between a VFR and an 1FR
aircraft.
Note: 500 ft vertical separation shall not
be applied below a heavy jet.
h. Within the TRSA, traffic information
on observed but unidentified targets will, to
the extent possible, be provided all IFR and
participating VFR aircraft...
4. PILOTS RESPONSIBILITY: THESE PRO-
GRAMS ARE NOT TO BE INTERPRETED
AS RELIEVING PILOTS OF THEIR
RESPONSIBILITIES TO SEE AND AVOID
OTHER TRAFFIC OPERATING IN BASIC
VFR WEATHER CONDITIONS . . .
TERMINAL CONTROL AREA OPERATION
1. Operating Rules: ... Regardless of
weather conditions ATC authorization is
required prior to operating within a TCA.
3. ATC Clearances and Separation: While
operating within a TCA, pilots are provided the
service and separation as in the stage III, Ter-
minal Radar Programs for VFR aircraft — In
the event of a radar outage, separation and
sequencing of VFR aircraft will be sus-
pended ...
4. Assignment of radar headings and/or
altitudes are based on the provision that a pilot
operating in accordance with visual flight rules
is expected to advise ATC if compliance with
an assigned route, radar heading or altitude will
cause the pilot to violate such rules.
1287. TCA METHODS:
a. Gear large turbine-powered aircraft
operating to or from the primary airport at an
altitude or via a route which will avoid airspace
being used by VFR traffic underneath the TCA
floor and within VFR corridors.
b. Vector aircraft to contain them in the
TCA once they have entered it. If it is neces-
sary to extend an aircraft's flight path outside
the TCA for spacing, the pilot shall be
informed when the aircraft leaves and reenters
the TCA.
c. An aircraf t executing a missed
approach or in other extenuating circumstances
is excluded from meeting the requirements
of (a) above ...
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